¹ Among the growing literature on the Sino-Soviet relationship the following books may be suggested: Barnett, A. Doak, Communist China and Asia (New York, 1960)Google Scholar, especially ch. 12; Hudson, G. F., Lowenthal, R. and MacFarquhar, R., The Sino-Soviet Dispute (London, 1961)Google Scholar; London, K., Unity and Contradiction (New York, 1962)Google Scholar; Zagoria, D., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton, 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On eastern European affairs see Zinner, P., ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York, 1957)Google Scholar; Hallowell, J. H., ed., Soviet Satellite Nations (Gainesville, 1958)Google Scholar; Bass, R. and Marbury, E., eds., The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948–1958 (New York, 1959)Google Scholar; Vali, F., Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass. 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the general problem of Communist bloc relations, see Brzezinski, Z., The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (rev. ed., New York, 1961)Google Scholar.

² For the purpose of brevity henceforth the word “doctrinal” will be used to cover both theological and ideological disputes, even though there are obvious differences between doctrine, theology and ideology.

³ It could be argued that the failure of the West to appraise Communism in terms other than those traditional to the West helped Communism in the phase of its weakness. Cf. Kennan, George, Russia and the West (New York, 1961)Google Scholar.

⁴ I have largely relied on Pastor, L., History of the Popes (32 vols., London, 1928–1940)Google Scholar.

⁵ For this reason, both organizations have established exclusive standards for membership. Cf. Lenin's “Twenty-one Conditions“ and, for example, the difficulties faced by the Chaldean monks in the 17th century.

⁶ Relatively, as compared to some others, less doctrinal, less disciplined, etc. Another way of looking at them would be to see them as international systems, but this tends to underestimate the internally binding factor of ideological commitment. See Modelski, G., The International Communist System, mimeo., Princeton, 1960Google Scholar, for a definition of “international system.”

⁷ For instance, the French king and the French church always stressed the traditions of Gallicanism as a justified restraint on Papal power. See the lengthy treatment in L. Pastor, op. cit., esp. vol. 32, pp. 246–325.

⁸ For different definitions of its special position of primacy see the November 1957 Twelve-Party Declaration and the December 1960 Eighty-One Party Declaration.

⁹ A fuller classification of Communist states might have the following categories: stages of doctrine-fulfillment; stages of social-economic development; unified or truncated states; indigenous or imposed Communist regimes; stable popular regimes; stable, unpopular regimes; unstable, unpopular regimes. It would be interesting to see whether there is any relationship between the above and the doctrinal attitudes of the ruling elites. However, that is a subject matter for a separate study.

¹⁰ See Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op. cit., and “The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc.” Foreign Affairs, 04 1961Google Scholar.

¹¹ Opposition to the Papacy was based on the argument that the earlier organization of the Church involved equality of all bishops: “Without prejudice to its agreement with the Church Universal in all essential points, every church manages its own affairs with perfect freedom and independence, and maintains its own traditional usages and discipline, all questions not concerning the whole Church, or of primary importance, being settled on the spot … Laws and Articles of faith, of universal obligation, are issued only by the full church, concentrated and represented at an Oecumenical Council.” Janus, , The Pope and the Council (London, 1869), pp. 85–86Google Scholar. (Janus, a 19th century writer, was bitterly opposed to the doctrine of Papal infallibility. A less one-sided source is the Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge 1957), Vols. IV, VGoogle Scholar; see also Sigmund, P. Jr., Hierarchy and Consent: The Political Theory of Nicholas of Cusa, Harvard Ph.D. thesis, 1959Google Scholar. I am much indebted to Dr. Sigmund for his critical but constructive comments.

¹² Although both institutions also contributed to the development of the intellectual underpinnings of Averroism and Gallicanism, respectively. See Janus, op. cit., pp. 151–181; also Pastor and Sigmund, op. cit., for fuller and less hostile accounts.

¹³ For example, “Savonarola's crime was disobedience to the Pope—and that Pope was Alexander VI. He was not a rebel against the apostolic See; but he was torn between the claims of obedience to God and submission to the orders of an unworthy Pope.” Nigg, W., Warriors of God (New York, 1959), p. 278Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Bishop Wazo of Liege, Bishop Hildebart of Le Mans, Rupert of Deutz, and Saint Bernard (see Janus, op. cit., p. 238).

¹⁵ Cf. Schapiro, L., The Origins of the Communist Autocracy (New York, 1956)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Cf. Brzezinski, , The Permanent Purge—Politics of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass., 1956)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Many credulous and semi-literate Soviet citizens, baffled by the dislocations caused by the first impact of the social revolution, probably swallowed the charge that some distinguished old Bolsheviks were derailing Soviet trains with the same seriousness with which their 13th and 14th century counterparts accepted the accounts of “nocturnal meetings, where the devil appeared in the form of a toad, a pale spectre, and a black tomcat, [with] wicked abominations … practiced.” Janus, op. cit., pp. 252–253.

¹⁸ In the case of Luther, see the report of the official Roman Censor Librorum “In praesumptuosas M. Lutheri Conclusiones Dialogus,” and Luther's “Responsio ad Silv. Prierietatis Dialogum,” in which he, however, still accepted Papal authority; in Tito's case, see the Stalin-Tito correspondence, in Bass and Marbury, op. cit.

¹⁹ My principal sources have been Pastor, op. cit., volumes 29–32; Tollemache, M., French Jansenists (London, 1893)Google Scholar; Abercrombie, N., The Origins of Jansenism (Oxford, 1936)Google Scholar. Specialists in Church history will perhaps forgive me for this very sketchy treatment. In my analysis I will not attempt a detailed historical summary nor deal with the theological content of Jansenism but only focus on those aspects which are relevant to the purposes of this study. Basically, the Jansenists, not unlike Calvinism, took a rather dim view of man's capacity to resist sin; they urged such intense and demanding standards before partaking of holy communion that many of them abstained from the sacrament for years at a time.

²⁰ It is interesting to note that much of the reform criticism came from the peripheries both in the case of Catholicism and Communism. Jansenism originated, as noted, in the Lowlands. Compare with the criticisms of Communism by the Yugoslav Djilas, or the Hungarian Nagy, etc.

²¹ The full title was “Augustinus, seu doctrina Sancti Augustini de Humanae Naturae Sanitate, Aegritudine, Medicina, Adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses” (Louvain, 1640), 3 vols.

²² Pastor, op. cit., vol. 29, p. 109. The Jansenist principles were: “(1) some of God's commandments are impossible to just men who wish and strive to keep them considering the powers they actually have; the grace by which these precepts may become possible is also wanting; (2) in the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace; (3) to merit, or to demerit in the state of fallen nature we must be free from all external constraint, but not from interior necessity; (4) the Semipelagians admitted the necessity of interior preventing grace for all acts, even for the beginning of faith; but they fell into heresy in pretending this grace is such that man may either follow it or reject it; (5) to say that Christ died or shed his blood for all men is Semipelagianism.” Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 8 (New York, 1913), p. 288Google Scholar.

²³ Pastor, op. cit., vol. 29, p. 114 ff.

²⁴ After Arnauld published in 1643 his De La Frequente Communion, the French government was prepared to apply sanctions against him but he was protected by the leading Paris circles and by some of the French bishops. Gallicanism resembles domesticism more than national communism; for the distinction see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op. cit., pp. 52–53. See Pastor, op. cit., vol. 32, ch. iv.

²⁵ The Jesuits were among the most active proponents of frequent communion. See Pastor, op. cit., vol. 29, p. 136.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 150.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 145.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 155.

²⁹ “Dogmatism and sectarianism … lead to the isolation of Communists from the masses ….” N. Khrushchev, speech of January 6, 1961.

³⁰ Pastor, op. cit., vol. 31, p. 198.

³¹ Ibid., vol. 29, p. 146.

³² “… the severity of the Jansenist principles, excessive though it was, operated in favor of the party.” Ibid. vol. 31, p. 261.

³³ Ibid., pp. 225–227. In this, too, there are contemporary parallels. For instance, the Albanians like to cite the Chinese on the subject of revisionism.

³⁴ But even here he equivocated somewhat. He thus made a distinction between infallibility of dogma and fact. Ibid., vol. 31, pp. 174–175.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 216.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 199–200.

³⁷ Compare to the Soviet effort to restrict the discussion of Chinese dogmatism only to the bloc, and the Chinese insistence on the participation of 81 parties. See my The Soviet Bloc, the Epilogue, op. cit.

³⁸ This is what Khrushchev did in 1955–56 when he blamed Stalin for the quarrel with Tito; and this the Chinese might do after Khrushchev's death, or the Soviets after Mao's.

³⁹ Pastor, op. cit., vol. 31, pp. 385–392. This arrangement bears great resemblance to the Tito-Khrushchev compromise whereby the Yugoslavs acted as if the Soviets had repudiated all the Cominform declarations, while the Soviets knew that this was not the case but remained silent. Similarly, when Rome placed on the Index a prayer book written by one of the pro-Jansenist French bishops, the Papal nuncio did not publish the decree in France. Ibid., vol. 31, p. 359.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 385.

⁴¹ The above decision did not come easily. A vigorous debate took place within the top councils of the organization's center, and sharply conflicting points of view were presented. Some cardinals advised acceptance of the compromise since “the sincerity of the subscription was vouched for by a public document, whereas the opposite rested solely on rumors and unreliable writings”, Ibid., vol. 31, p. 395. The opposite point of view warned against accepting the alleged submission when it was well known that it was not genuine. Cardinal Albizzi who handled much of this matter pleaded: “I cannot suffer that an attempt should be made to persuade the world that this heresy had been destroyed, seeing that in spite of its seeming destruction it appears more vigorous than ever” (ibid., p. 396). It may be assumed that Moscow has also faced similar dilemmas. There is evidence that on the Yugoslav issue Molotov pleaded with Khrushchev not to create the impression that Yugoslavia is again orthodox since it would undermine international Communism. (The Soviet Bloc, pp. 175–177.)

⁴² Pastor, op. cit., vol. 31, p. 485 for data.

⁴³ Ibid., vol. 32, pp. 424, 656 ff. for efforts to kill with kindness.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 310–312.

⁴⁵ Tollemaehe, op. cit., p. 250.

⁴⁶ For a fascinating account of Jesuit efforts in China, see China in the Sixteenth Century: the Journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583–1610 (New York, 1953)Google Scholar. An interesting statement of the tactical problems faced by the Jesuits is in Duignan, P., “Early Jesuit Missionaries: A Suggestion for Further Study,” The American Anthropologist, August 1958Google Scholar. This account was prompted by Mr. Duignan's analysis.

⁴⁷ Ricci, op. cit., pp. 142, 147.

⁴⁸ Quoted by Nigg, op. cit., p. 335.

⁴⁹ Ricci, op. cit., pp. 93, 96. See also Duignan, op. cit.

⁵⁰ Ricci, op. cit., pp. 137–139.

⁵¹ Pastor, op. cit., vol. 25, p. 355.

⁵² Ricci, op. cit., p. 325. Elsewhere he says “The Fathers have made an effort to merit a reputation for learning, not as a matter of vain glory but with a view to the end for which they came here, namely to further the cause of Christianity, which on all occasions they purposely weave into their conversations,” p. 201. Similar techniques were employed by the Jesuits, under Roberto de Nobili, in their approach to Indian Brahmins, Pastor, op. cit., vol. 25, pp. 359–361.

⁵³ Compare “Present-day leftism in the Communist movement is also manifested in both concealed and overt resistance to the Communist parties' policy of establishing collaboration with working people in the ranks of the social-democratic, Catholic and various other bourgeois-radical parties and organizations.” (Sovietskaya Rossiya, June, 10 1960); and the warning contained in Kommunist, No. 13, 1960, against those who exaggerate revolutionary feelings and “call for direct revolutionary overthrow,” with the following Chinese statements: “History teaches us that people's revolutions in all countries stem from the needs of the people and are the result of the development of class struggle” (Red Flag, No. 20–21, 1960), and “The modern revisionists and certain representatives of the bourgeoisie try to make the people believe that it is possible to achieve socialism without a revolutionary party …. This is sheer nonsense and deception” (Red Flag. No. 8, 1960). See Hudson et al, op. cit., for detailed treatment.

⁵⁴ Pastor, op. cit., vol. 25, p. 150.

⁵⁵ Nigg, op. cit., p. 351.

⁵⁶ Pastor, op. cit., vol. 29, p. 250.

⁵⁷ The Communist Kirkuk rising took place in July 1959. The World Marxist Review, April 1960, contains a self-criticism by the Iraqi C. P. which reveals that an allegedly dissident group of Communists was responsible for this highly premature action.

⁵⁸ See Pastor, op. cit., vol. 31, pp. 165–169 concerning the disputed practices.

⁵⁹ There is an inclination in some quarters to exaggerate the present power of the CCP. It is to be remembered that China's general backwardness, overpopulation, economic difficulties, etc. all place it in a position vis-a-vis the USSR analogous in many respects to that of India vis-a-vis the United States in the non-Communist world. It is curious that when India is discussed its over population is normally mentioned as a factor of weakness. When talk shifts to China, then the same factor is normally mentioned as proof of China's power.

⁶⁰ This tactic was used by the University of Louvain when confronted by instructions from Rome. See Pastor, op. cit., vol. 31, p. 263.

⁶¹ The center can also use this dodge to protect itself against claims. For instance, the public Soviet emphasis on achieving a higher standard of living can be seen as a form of commitment to a third party (i.e., its own people) which makes it difficult for the Soviet Union to respond fully to the demands of its allies for economic aid. E.g., when China demands greater aid, the Soviet leadership can point to its public commitment as an excuse for not giving it.

⁶² Schelling, T., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 161Google Scholar.

⁶³ Khrushchev had to face this difficulty in 1960 when criticized by the Chinese. He responded that “If we act like children who, studying the alphabet, compile words from letters, we shall not go very far. Marx, Engels and Lenin created their immortal works which will not fade away in centuries …. On the basis of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism we must think ourselves, profoundly study life, analyze the present situation and draw the conclusions which benefit the common cause of communism.” (Speech of June 21, 1960). The more “revisionist” the position, the more difficult it is to resist “literalist” criticisms. The Chinese warned that “as pupils of Lenin and as Leninists, we must utterly smash all attempts of the modern revisionists to distort and carve up the teachings of Lenin.” (Red Flag, No. 8, 1960.)

⁶⁴ This gives the physically weaker but more extreme deviant a bargaining advantage. If, for instance, in the Sino-Soviet dispute the Soviet and Chinese preferences were as follows:

Soviet

(1) Only Moscow speaks for the movement on doctrinal issues.

(2) Neither speaks; i.e., agreement to silence.

(3) Both speak, i.e., open dispute.

(4) Only Peking speaks, i.e., capitulation.

Chinese

(1) Only Peking speaks ….

(2) Both speak, i.e., open dispute.

(3) Neither speaks.

(4) Only Moscow speaks, i.e., capitulation.

then, using game theory, the advantage would rest with the Chinese. See Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H., Games and Decisions (New York, 1958), pp. 146–149Google Scholar for alternative mathematical calculations, on the basis of a payoff matrix, of relative scales of advantage. (The above example is adapted from their use of two individuals resolving a problem of conflicting choices.)

⁶⁵ The center must watch out against the danger that a precipitous condemnation of the deviant can actually force distantly potential deviants into deviation. For instance, the Dominicans feared that condemnation of Jansenism would reflect on them (Pastor, op. cit., vol. 29, p. 118). Might not some Communist parties object to an explicit condemnation of the dogmatists for fear that this would reflect on them as well?

⁶⁶ For this reason, posthumous personalization of deviation has some merit since it allows room for hope that unity ultimately will be restored. However, premature personalization runs the risk that emotion may obscure reason. We might thus distinguish between spontaneous, personal conflict—one involving the role of personal antipathy or of personality which tends to become emotional, direct, and all-out; and protracted, institutional conflict, which leaves greater room for skilled management and more tacit bargaining (cf. Schelling, op. cit., p. 21).

⁶⁷ See Modelski, op. cit., p. 67, for in-system conflict resolution. It is revealing to observe that after the Suez crisis, the British Conservative and Labour Parties were also much more lenient with their respective “fundamentalist” deviants than with their “moderates.” See Epstein, L. D., “British M.P.s and their Local Parties: the Suez Cases,” this Review, 06, 1960, esp. pp. 381–385Google Scholar.

^67a Alternatively, it might be issued when the opponent is already in the process of being defeated. Presumably this was why Abraham Lincoln, who had insisted earlier that preservation of the Union, not slavery, was the issue in the Civil War, delayed the Emancipation Proclamation until after he had significant victory on the battle field to give it weight. (I am indebted to Professor Mansfield for this observation.)

⁶⁸ Luther, Arnauld, Tito, Hoxha, all apparently started off with no desire to split.

⁶⁹ Arnauld, Luther, Tito refused; Gomulka went in 1956; Hoxha apparently hesitated. Many of Gomulka's friends urged him not to go.

⁷⁰ This might be called the center's asset of inconsistently uncivilized behavior.

⁷¹ See Schelling, op. cit., p. 115, for a discussion of the role of “inherently unknowable factors.”

⁷² Thus, for example, the general theme that no country can build socialism alone (with its implied threat of isolation of China) was certainly more credible when quietly accompanied by illustrative steps—gradual shutting off of her supplies, etc.

⁷³ This has resulted in a paradoxical situation whereby Tito, who is outside the Communist orbit, is closer to Khrushchev than Hoxha, who is within it. See the excellent discussion in Griffith, W. E., “Peiping, Tirana and Moscow,” East Europe, July 1961Google Scholar.

^73a This paper was submitted for publication prior to the open Soviet attack on Albania in October 1961, and not revised in the light of subsequent events.

⁷⁴ The sudden Soviet move against the Chinese in Bucharest in the summer of 1960 did much to intensify the bitterness.

⁷⁵ The fullest and most systematic treatment of the nature of praxeology (principles of correct, rational decisions) is in Kotarbinski, T., Traktat o dobrej robocie (Warsaw, 1955)Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ The Yugoslavs are a good example.

⁷⁷ See Modelski, op. cit., p. 23 for a discussion of system-orientation towards expansion. The analogy here is between the attitude of a given Communist state, even a deviant one, toward a general Communist expansion, and the attitude of a Christian state toward the crusades.

⁷⁸ This was well illustrated by the difficulties encountered by Westerners in deciphering the various moves by Tito in 1955–1957 and by the Chinese more recently.

⁷⁹ Brzezinski, “The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc,” op. cit., for a discussion.

⁸⁰ Tarn, R. S., “Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy,” International Journal, Autumn, 1950CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brzezinski, , Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York, 1962)Google Scholar, ch. 4. See also the symposium on ideology in Dallin, A., ed., Soviet Conduct in World Affairs (New York, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁸¹ A good discussion is in R. Lowenthal's contribution to his volume with Hudson, et al., op. cit.

⁸² See A. Halpern, “The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism,” RAND Mimeograph Study 2026, July 1960; Zagoria, D., “Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas,” Problems of Communism, 03-April, 1961Google Scholar; Thornton, T., “Peking, Moscow and the Underdeveloped Areas,” World Politics, 07 1961Google Scholar; Whiting, A, “Moscow and Peking: Suspended Dialogue?”, Current Scene, 06 21, 1961Google Scholar.

⁸³ An obvious rule-of-thumb runs as follows: the death of friendly leaders always makes relations worse; the death of unfriendly leaders can improve them if the conflict has not become institutionalized by organizational clashes. For some recent discussions of the problem of succession, see: Conquest, R., Power and Policy—USSR (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Hinton, H., “The Succession Problem in Communist China,” Current Scene, 07 19, 1961Google Scholar; Rush, M., The Khrushchev Succession Problem, RAND Mimeograph Study 2283, 1961Google Scholar.