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Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Charles Cameron
Affiliation:
Columbia University
David Epstein
Affiliation:
Columbia University
Sharyn O'Halloran
Affiliation:
Columbia University

Abstract

Majority-minority voting districts have been advanced as a remedy to the underrepresentation of minority interests in the political process. Yet, their efficacy in furthering the substantive goals of minority constituents has been questioned because they may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas and lead to an overall decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation. Thus, there may be a trade-off between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community. Using nonlinear estimation techniques, we simulate the districting strategies that maximize substantive minority representation, and find that such a trade-off does exist. We also find that, outside of the South, dividing minority voters equally across districts maximizes substantive representation; inside the South the optimal scheme creates concentrated districts on the order of 47% black voting age population. In addition, minority candidates may have a substantial chance of being elected from districts with less than 50% minority voters.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996 

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