Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
This paper examines William Riker's thesis that only minimum winning coalitions form in n-person zero-sum symmetric games. It demonstrates that Riker's conclusion is false by identifying the conditions under which larger than minimum winning coalitions can form. Since these conditions are quite general it indicates that Riker's conclusion is valid only for a highly restricted class of games. This class of games is identified as those in which players not in a minimum winning coalition have no incentive to form any coalitions among themselves. These games are characterized as games inessential over coalitions of losers. Only in these games can minimum winning coalitions be expected to form exclusively. In all other games, larger than minimum winning coalitions are possible.
I have been the beneficiary of a great deal of helpful inspiration and criticism in the preparation of this paper. The impetus for it was provided by an idea in a preliminary draft of Oran Young's paper, “The Size of Winning Coalitions: A Note on Riker's Size Principle.” The argument has been refined and expanded as a result of truly helpful comments from Lawrence Dodd, Russell Hardin, Joe Oppenheimer, Kenneth Shepsle, Jeff Smith, and Harrison Wagner. I am deeply grateful for their help. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Haven, Connecticut, March 1974. Research on this paper was supported by National Science Foundation Grant #GS-33490.
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