Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T09:16:30.168Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

“Killer” Amendments in Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John D. Wilkerson*
Affiliation:
University of Washington

Abstract

For more than three decades, social choice theorists and legislative scholars have studied how legislative outcomes in Congress can be manipulated through strategic amendments and voting. I address the central limitation of this research, a virtual absence of systematic empirical work, by examining 76 “killer” amendments considered during the 103d and 104th congresses. I trace the effects of these amendments on their related bills using archival sources, test for strategic voting using NOMINATE as the baseline measure of legislator preferences across a range of issues, and explore with OLS regression why some killer amendments are more strategically important than others. The findings indicate that successful killer amendments and identifiable strategic voting are extremely rare. In none of the cases examined could the defeat of a bill be attributed to adoption of an alleged killer amendment.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.