Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T20:16:39.426Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A List System with Single Candidate Preference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Harold F. Gosnell
Affiliation:
University of Chicago

Extract

This article is not intended as a criticism of the objectives of proportional representation. The election of the New York City council in 1937 and the seven Cincinnati council elections under the Hare system of proportional representation have undoubtedly resulted in the improvement of the caliber of the legislative bodies in those cities. The aim of this article is to suggest certain rules which may secure some of the advantages of the Hare system without a long and costly count.

Information

Type
American Government and Politics
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1939

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.