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Public Goods, Private Interests, and Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1989

John E. Jackson
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
David C. King
Affiliation:
University of Michigan

Abstract

We estimate a model of House members' roll call voting decisions embodying some hypotheses about representation, including estimates of the influence of district opinion on broad collective issues relative to personal economic interests, of the effect of electoral security on constituency responsiveness, and of the difference in constituency and party voting among Republicans and Democrats. This model is estimated with votes taken during deliberations on the 1978 Tax Reform Act, important because it was a significant change from the tax reforms passed in the late 1960s and 1970s, marked the first appearance of the Kemp-Roth proposed tax cut, and represented a concerted effort by Republicans to make tax policy a broad national issue. Findings indicate that constituent preferences for redistribution are important influences on representatives' decisions and that Republicans exhibited a greater degree of party voting than the Democrats while the Democrats better represented their constituent's preferences.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989

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