Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
An enduring fact of life in democratic electoral systems is that the party winning the largest share of the votes almost always receives a still larger share of the seats. This paper tests three models describing the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party and then develops explanations of the observed differences in the swing ratio and the partisan bias of an electoral system. The “cube law” is rejected as a description, since it assumes uniformity (which is not observed in the data) across electoral systems. Explanations for differences in swing ratio and bias are found in variations in turnout over districts, the extent of the “nationalization” of politics, and, most importantly, in who does the districting or reapportionment. The measures of swing ratio and partisan bias appear useful for the judicial evaluation of redistricting schemes and may contribute to the reduction of partisan and incumbent gerrymandering.
I wish to thank Joseph G. Verbalis, Harold George, Nita Rome, Judith Rowe, and Richard A. Sun for their help in the collection and the analysis of the data. Orley Ashenfelter, Stanley Kelley, Jr., John L. McCarthy, Frederick Mosteller, Walter F. Murphy, Richard E. Quandt, and Dennis F. Thompson provided advice and criticism during the course of the work. Edward Franklin Cox, Gudmund Iversen, and David Mayhew generously gave me access to unpublished materials on congressional elections. The Center for International Studies and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, provided financial support for the work. Computations were performed at the Princeton University Computer Center, operating under NSF grants GJ-34 and GU-3157. None of these individuals or institutions bears responsibility for the analysis or interpretations of the paper.
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