Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The world is complex, and yet people are able to make some sense out of it. This paper offers an information-processing model to describe this aspect of perception and cognition. The model assumes that a person receives information which is less than perfect in terms of its completeness, its accuracy, and its reliability. The model provides a dynamic description of how a person evaluates this kind of information about a case, how he selects one of his pre-existing patterns (called schemata) with which to interpret the case, and how he uses the interpretation to modify and extend his beliefs about the case. It also describes how this process allows the person to make the internal adjustments which will serve as feedback for the interpretation of future information. A wide variety of evidence from experimental and social psychology is cited to support the decisions which went into constructing the separate parts of the schema theory, and further evidence is cited supporting the theory's system-level predictions. Since the schema theory allows for (but does not assume) the optimization of its parameters, it is also used as a framework for a normative analysis of the selection of schemata. Finally, a few illustrations from international relations and especially foreign-policy formation show that this model of how people make sense out of a complex world can be directly relevant to the study of important political processes.
For their help I wish to thank Helga Novotny of Cambridge University; A. K. Sen of the London School of Economics; Brian Barry of Oxford University; Barry R. Schlenker of the State University of New York at Albany; Ian Budge, Michael Bloxam, Norman Schofield and Michael Taylor of the University of Essex; Ole Holsti of the University of British Columbia; Ernst Haas and Jeffrey Hart of the University of California at Berkeley; Cedric Smith of the University of London; Zolton Domotor of the University of Pennsylvania; and my research assistants Jacob Bercovitch, Ditsa Kafry, and William Strawn. Parts of this paper have been presented at research seminars at Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University (Jerusalem), Technion (Haifa), the London School of Economics, and the University of Essex. I am grateful to the discussants at all these places. For their generous financial support I wish to thank the Institute of International Studies of the University of California at Berkeley, the Fellowship Program of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the NATO Postdoctoral Fellowship Program of the National Science Foundation. Of course the author is solely responsible for the views presented in this paper.
In reviewing the psychological literature I have relied heavily on Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, second edition (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968, 1969), especially the chapters by Berger and Lambert “Stimulus-Response Theory in Contemporary Social Psychology,” I, 81–178; Seymour Rosenberg, “Mathematical Models of Social Behavior,” I, 179–244; Robert B. Zajonc, “Cognitive Theories in Social Psychology,” I, 320–411; Leonard Berkowitz, “Social Motivation,” III, 50–135; Henri Tajfel, “Social and Cultural Factors in Perception,” III, 315–394; and George A. Miller and David McNeill, “Psycholinguistics,” III, 666–794.
Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.