Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
In this study formal spatial models are applied to cross-sectional analysis of district results on the second ballot of French legislative elections. A model of probabilistic spatial voting better accounts for the data than either standard “ecological” models or a model of deterministic spatial voting. There are three substantive findings concerning voter behavior. First, the adjustment of voters to external information can be largely viewed as a shift in the spatial (Left-Right) distribution of voters. This shift, plus decisions by parties and candidates as to which districts parties will contest, determines the first ballot outcome. In arriving at second ballot choices, voters then appear to utilize decision rules that have a substantial degree of temporal stability. A second and related finding is that the second ballot can be reasonably accounted for by a single Left-Right dimension. Third, in those districts with three or more candidates on the second ballot, there may be substantial strategic voting with voters switching from candidates close to their ideal points but unlikely to win to more distant candidates who are more likely to win. The existence of strategic voting is suggested by the finding that models based solely on spatial preferences perform well for two-candidate districts, but less well for three- or four-candidate districts.
This research was supported, in part, by a Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship to Howard Rosenthal and, in part, by National Science Foundation Grant GS-33754. Valuable comments were provided by Timothy McGuire, Peter Ordeshook, and Samuel Popkin. We thank David Wood for supplying his deputy scale positions. We also wish to thank Richard Castanias, Alexander Lebanon, and Mushin Lee, research assistants. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago.
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