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Voting and Vetoing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Eyal Winter*
Affiliation:
Washington University and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996 

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