^1. This word is borrowed openly from Simon Collier’s thoughtful review of Nunn, Frederick M., The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810–1973 (Albuquerque, 1976), appearing in Journal of Latin American Studies, VIII, 2 (November 1976), 352–54.Google Scholar

² See Wilkie, James W., Elitelore (Los Angeles, 1973)Google Scholar; and Wilkie, James W. and de Wilkie, Edna Monzón, “Dimensions of Elitelore: An Oral History Questionnaire,” Journal of Latin American Lore, 1, 1 (Summer 1975), 79–101.Google Scholar

³ In “American Historians and the World Today,” American Historical Review, LXXX, 1 (February, 1975), 19.

⁴ These terms are used in Lasswell, Harold D., Lerner, Daniel, and Rothwell, C.E., The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and a Bibliography (Stanford, Calif., 1952), 6 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keller, Suzanne, “Elites,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (17 vols., New York, 1968), 5: 26.Google Scholar

⁵ Not to slight the navies, it should be pointed out that Latin America’s admirals are much removed from Gilbert and Sullivan’s “Ruler of the Queen’s Navee,” that office boy, clerk, solicitor, MP, First Lord of the Admiralty (but no professional officer), Sir Joseph Porter, K.C.B. H.M.S. Pinafore, Act 1.

⁶ McAlister, Lyle N., “Recent Research and Writing on the Role of the Military in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review, 2, 1 (Fall 1966), 5–36 Google Scholar. At the time McAlister wrote there were but two major works dealing with the long-range historical aspects of Latin American military-civilian relations: Johnson, John J., The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, 1964)Google Scholar; and the pioneer effort by Lieuwen, Edwin, Arms and Politics in Latin America (rev. ed., New York, 1961).Google Scholar

⁷ See for example, Potash, Robert A., The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1938–1945; Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford, 1969)Google Scholar; McAlister, Lyle N., Maingot, Anthony P. and Potash, Robert A., The Military in Latin American Scoiopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies (Washington, D.C., 1970)Google Scholar; and Stepan, Alfred, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971).Google Scholar

⁸ Should such a command ring familiar in Spanish, it is little wonder. Michael C. Meyer employed this paraphrase of Longfellow in a recent essay advocating exploitation of hitherto barely tapped sources of documentation to study the Mexican Revolution from the standpoint of the common man. See his “Habla por ti mismo, Juan: Una propuesta para un método alternativo de investigación,” Historia Mexicana, XXII, 3 (Jan.-March 1973), 396–408; revised and published in English as “Speak for Yourself Juan,” Journal of Latin American Lore, I, 2 (Winter 1975), 163–171.

⁹ I readily confess to less expertise on navies, air forces and gendarmeries. It is obvious that they merit consideration in the same way that armies do. Navylore, air force lore and policelore exist in the same forms as does armylore, and provide scholars with documentation ideal for comparision and contrast of professional thought and self-perception, and for the positing of conclusions on intramilitary relations as well as relations with the civilian sector. A working list of professional literature is presented in Einaudi, Luigi and Goldhammer, Herbert, “An Annotated Bibliography of Latin American Military Journals,” Latin American Research Review, 2, 2 (Spring 1967), 95–122.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The following sampling of juxtaposed published and unpublished items from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru shows continuity of thought and self-perception over the decades. Volume and issue numbers are omitted because of inconsistencies over the years.

From Argentina: Sánchez Ruiz, Colonel Jorge Alberto, “El ejército argentino y la comunidad nacional, 1900–1930: Doctrina, estrategia, táctica” (unpub. essay, Secretaría de Guerra, Centro de Altos Estudios, Buenos Aires, 1965), 37 pp.Google Scholar; and Soria, Captain Gaspar, “El oficial argentino: El ejército argentino debe sustentar los ideales del pueblo,” Revista del Círculo Militar (January 1917), 21–24.Google Scholar

From Brazil: de Paula Cidade, General Francisco, “Da Missão Militar Francesa aos Nossos Dias,” Revista Militar Brasileira (July-December 1954), 131–86Google Scholar; and d’Araújo Mello, Lieutenant Heitor, “O Brasil Como Nação Armada,” Revista dos Militares (May 1914), 193–205.Google Scholar

For Chile: See infra, n. 39 and n. 99.

For Peru: Morla Concha, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel, “La función social del ejército peruano en la organización de la nacionalidad,” Revista Militar del Perú (October 1933), 843–72 (reprinted, April 1952, viii-xxv)Google Scholar; Mercado Jarrín, General Edgardo, “El ejército de hoy y su proyección en nuestra sociedad en período de transición,” Revista Militar del Perú (November-December 1964), 1–20.Google Scholar

¹¹ See infra, n. 44.

¹² ¿Nueva mentalidad militaren el Perú? (Buenos Aires, 1969).

¹³ Eg., Gerth, H.H. and Wright Mills, C., trs. and eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, 1972), esp. chaps. 8Google Scholar, “Bureaucracy,” 196–244, and 10, “The Meaning of Discipline,” 253–66; Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), esp. chap. 1, “Officership vs Profession,” 7–19 Google Scholar; and Janowitz, Morris, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, 1964), esp. chap. 2, “The Internal Organization of the Military,” 51–74.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Ortega, José y Gasset, , “The Idea of the Generation,” Man and Crisis, tr. Adams, Mildred (New York, 1962), 32.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Professor Steve C. Ropp of New Mexico State University very kindly turned over to me biographical data sheets of 88 cadets graduating from the Chilean military academy (Escuela Militar Bernardo O'Higgins) in 1967 and immediately destined for the Officer Orientation Course, School of the Americas, Panama Canal Zone, January-February 1968. The information was compiled by the U.S. Military Group in Chile and sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Hardly “classified” or “eyes only” material, it is an excellent source of information on a potential intra-army core group. Where are they now?

¹⁶ In August and September 1975 I interviewed and conversed with a number of Chilean army, navy, air force and police officers. I dined one evening at the home of the Under Secretary of War, accompanied by the Sub-Director of Carabineros de Chile, an air force major and the United States Army Attaché. The evening ended with a lengthy after-dinner “where were you on September 11, 1973” session which I considered extremely revealing of the (self-) perception of a shared experience, not readily available except in anecdotes and reminiscences of this sort.

¹⁷ The following published sources are exemplary of the approach discussed in this essay. Villanueva, Victor, El CAEM y la revolución de la fuerza armada (Lima, 1972)Google Scholar; de Moraes, Marechal J.B. Mascarenhas (commanding officer of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force), Memorias (2 vols., Rio de Janeiro, 1969)Google Scholar; and Orona, Juan V., La logia militar que enfrentó a Hipólito Yrigoyen (San Martín, Logia General) (Buenos Aires, 1965)Google Scholar; and La logia militar que derrocó a Castillo (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, GOU) (Buenos Aires, 1966).

On la tercera independencia, as September 11, 1973 is known, see supra, n. 16. The recent essay by Hayes, Robert A., “The Military Club and National Politics in Brazil,” in Keith, Henry H. and Hayes, , eds., Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil (Tempe, 1976), 139–76Google Scholar, is illuminating on the influence of a major intra-army core group. José Luis de Imaz also discusses loyalties within and without the officer corps in Los que mandan (Buenos Aires, 1964). Mascarenhas de Moraes and Imaz are available in translation.

¹⁸ “Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1967).

¹⁹ This interview-cum-conversation lasted 43 minutes. The general was frank and open in his comments, blunt in his hostility towards Marxism, Allende and politiquería; firm in his advocacy of a purging of Chilean leftists, the need for a new political system and government action to eradicate sources of socio-economic conflict. He is a man of few words. See infra, n. 123 and n. 126.

²⁰ CBS News Special: “Rescue at Entebbe,” September 14, 1976.

²¹ In print, see Colonel, Lieutenant (r.) Orsolini, Mario Horacio, La crisis del ejército (Buenos Aires, 1964)Google Scholar; and Ejército argentinoy crecimiento nacional (Buenos Aires, 1965), in which the writer develops the thesis of a long struggle within the army between two “sub-sub-systems”: the “National Professional Army” and a “partisan and ideological army,” with the former gaining the advantage in the mid-1960's with the triumph of professionalism. See the earlier, similar viewpoints expressed on Brazil in General de Carvalho, Estevão Leitão, Dever Militar e Política Partidária (São Paulo, 1959).Google Scholar

²² This coincides neatly with the Wilkies’ concept of elitelore expressed in “Dimensions of Elitelore,” cited supra, n.2.

²³ See “New Thoughts on Military Intervention in Latin American Politics: The Chilean Case, 1973,” Journal of Latin American Studies, VII, 2 (November 1975), 281–86; and The Military in Chilean History, 193, 261, 265 and 292. In an earlier work I discussed published works of a more general nature that were useful in the search for origins of professionalism, some of which could be classified as militarylore. See “The Latin American Military Establishment: Some Thoughts on the Origins of Its Socio-Political Role and an Illustrative Bibliographical Essay,” The Americas, XXVIII, 2 (October 1971), 135–51.

²⁴ Had one North American political scientist (who claims some expertise in things Peruvian) but thought a bit, he would not have concluded some years ago that products of CAEM are too naive and narrow minded. This scholar based his conclusion partially on the wrong type of information: according to his account a CAEM student asked a visiting former foreign policy and security expert from the United States if the United States armed forces had a policy on “the race question” as a national security matter. This was interpreted as a stupid question. It was not; for the Peruvian armed forces, national security is directly linked to internal development, that in turn to the “Indian problem.” It is not unreasonable to think that Peruvians assume a similar linkage elsewhere. A knowledge of military thought and self-perception would have permitted a sophisticated conclusion instead of a condescending one.

²⁵ Johnson’s discussion of civilian attitudes in literature remains the best. See The Military and Society in Latin America, 80–90, 153–73, 224–43. It is interesting to note that on the whole (albeit a tenuous basis for firm conclusions), the civilian image of the military is historically a mixed one, while the military view of civilians is preponderantly negative. See also my conclusions on the exertion of civilian influences on the Chilean military in 1973 in The Military in Chilean History, 306–07.

²⁶ The well-known views of Alegría, Bilac, Lugones and Vargas Llosa obviate the necessity for copious documentation, but Poli and Rueda are not well known. See the rapturous Poli’s O Exército Visto por urn Civil (Rio de Janeiro, 1969); and Rueda’s, essays, El ejército nacional (Bogotá, 1968)Google Scholar. Both were published by the military.

²⁷ In the scholarly works mentioned earlier in this essay, navies definitely are not considered as important in the context of military-civilian relations as are armies. Nor do I consider them so. The Collier review of my The Military in Chilean History cited in n. 1, supra, and Harold Blakemore's review in the Times Literary Supplement, August 6, 1976 point this out cogently (and reveal the enduring British viewpoint on naval preeminence). Sater’s, William F., The Heroic Image in Chile: Arturo Prat, Secular Saint (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), is in many respects a contribution to navylore.Google Scholar

²⁸ “Conferencias: Política militar I,” Memorial del Estado Mayor del Ejército de Chile (January 1911), 423. This stand did not prevent the retired General Vial from taking part in a cabal with civilians opposed to President Arturo Alessandri Palma in 1924. The Memorial later changed its name to simply Memorial del Ejército de Chile (MECH). I continue to omit vol. and no. owing to inconsistency on the part of the publisher.

²⁹ See Nunn, Frederick M., “Emil Körner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process and Consequences, 1885–1920,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 50, no. 2 (May 1970), 300–322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ von der Goltz, Baron Colmar, The Nation in Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War, tr. Ashworth, Philip A. (London, 1913)Google Scholar. The first German edition was published in 1883. Material cited herein comes from the early, non-technical portion of the book. It first appeared in an English translation in 1883, and in Spanish as La nación en armas (Toledo, 1897).

³¹ Goltz, 8–10.

³² Goltz, 11, 22.

³³ Goltz, 51–63, passim.

³⁴ To the point where in 1898 one Argentine observer accused the Chileans of having become mimics by using to extreme the German parade (goose) step. “To see troops marching in this ridiculous manner is painful; to see officers march [the same way] is embarassing.” Goose-stepping Chileans were called “comical, absurd and laughable,” and the author could not help noting that marching in such a way in wet weather made for an abundance of “spattered mud.” “A.M.,” El ejército chileno y la guerra de mañana (Buenos Aires, 1898), 69. For a detailed study of German military activity in Chile see Schaefer, Jürgen, Deutsche Militarhilfe an Südamerika: Militar-und Rüstungsinteressen in Argentinien, Bolivien, Chile vor 1914 (Düsseldorf, 1974).Google Scholar

³⁵ Ernesto, Medina F., El problema militar de Chile (Leipzig, 1912)Google Scholar. It is important to remember how much Medina relied on Goltz and how much Goltz, in turn, relied on Clausewitz’s classic Vom Kriege. Indeed, Goltz believed Clausewitz had treated war definitively.

³⁶ Medina, 61–65.

³⁷ Medina, 39.

³⁸ Medina, 83–86.

³⁹ See Figueroa, Alberto Muñoz, El problema de nuestra educación militar (Santiago, 1914)Google Scholar; Terán, Domingo L., Tema militar (Santiago, 1917)Google Scholar; Riquelme, Aníbal, “Relación que debe existir entre la política de un estado i el alto comando del ejército,” Memorial del Estado Mayor del Ejército de Chile (September, 1914), 638–50Google Scholar. See also Bravo, Manuel Moore, Instrucciones para el desarrollo de las virtudes militares del cuerpo de oficiales de la IV división del ejército (Valdivia, 1917).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Muñoz, 20–56, passim.

⁴¹ Terán, 10–20.

⁴² Moore, 21–24.

⁴³ Riquelme, 641–44.

⁴⁴ Revue des Deux Mondes (March 15, 1891), 443–59. See the Gabriel Velarde Alvarez, Peruvian Lieutenant Colonel, “Instrucción civil del soldado,” Boletín del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina (October 1904), 43–5.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Lyautey, 445–46.

⁴⁶ Lyautey, 447–59, passim.

⁴⁷ Full title: Vigilia de armas: Charlas sobre la vida militar destinadas a un joven teniente (Santiago, 1920).

⁴⁸ See de Vigny, Alfred Victor, Servitude et Grandeurs Militaires (1st ed., Paris, 1835)Google Scholar. At this early date Vigny eloquently placed emphasis on abnegation, duty and obedience as desirable traits, especially in peacetime. He also noted the potential for mutual hostility in military-civilian relations. Barros had read Vigny.

⁴⁹ Barros, 10.

⁵⁰ Barros, 11–12, 20, 27.

⁵¹ Barros, 21–22, 61–62.

⁵² Barros, 39.

⁵³ Barros, 41–43.

⁵⁴ Barros, 47, 130–131. “Military leadership uses emotional means of all sorts—just as the most sophisticated techniques of religious discipline, the exercitia spiritualia of Ignatius Loyola do in their way.” Max Weber (Gerth and Mills, 254).

⁵⁵ Barros, 127–37.

⁵⁶ See Nunn, Frederick M., Chilean Politics, 1920–1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces, 9–27, (Albuquerque, 1970), and The Military in Chilean History, 107–45. Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Such basic sources as Bascuñán, Arturo Ahumada, El ejército y la revolutión del 5 de septiembre, 1924: Reminiscencias (Santiago, 1931)Google Scholar; Bennett Argandoña, Juan Pablo, La revolución del 5 de setiembre de 1924 (Santiago, 1925)Google Scholar; and Morales, Carlos Sáez, Recuerdos de un soldado, 3 vols. (Santiago, 1933–34)Google Scholar, are in this category, although each, especially the Sáez work, does contain passages which contribute significantly to armylore.

⁵⁸ Interview with General (r.) Bartolomé Blanche Espejo, Santiago, September 10, 1969.

⁵⁹ Orígenes del problema social en Chile: Tema de invierno (Santiago, 1926), 26 ff.

⁶⁰ lbánez: Caudillo enigmático (Santiago, 1958). Captain Würth was a minor participant in the military-political crisis of 1924, and his book is, in the main, a critical biography, not a treatment of military thought.

⁶¹ Ahumada, 39.

⁶² Sáez, I, 33–35; Bennett, 13–14, confirmed this.

⁶³ See Marín, Oscar Fenner, Observaciones sobre la labor que corresponderá la comisión revisera de las leyes de justicia militar (Santiago, 1922)Google Scholar; Menezes, David Bari, El ejército ante las nuevas doctrinas sociales (Santiago, 1922)Google Scholar; Espejo, Bartolomé Blanche, Heridas abiertas (Santiago, 1924)Google Scholar; Sotomayor, Gaspar Mora, “El ejército y la opinión pública,” MECH (October, 1926), 831–34Google Scholar; and Benedicto, Agustín P., El ejército en el estado moderno (Santiago, 1929).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ de Gaulle, Charles, The Edge of the Sword, tr. Hopkins, Gerard (New York, 1960).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ de Gaulle, 108–09.

⁶⁶ de Gaulle, 23–59, passim.; 103–06.

⁶⁷ Seeckt, Hans von, Thoughts of a Soldier, tr. Waterhouse, Gilbert (London, 1930), 79–80.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Seeckt, 74–75. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁹ Such transnational concurrence was not limited to Latin American and European armed forces. See observations on the influence of Clausewitz in France, Japan, the United States, England and the U.S.S.R. owing to disciples like Goltz, in Leonard, Roger Ashley, ed., A Short Guide to Clausewitz on War (New York, 1967), 34–37 Google Scholar. “On War became the bible of military thought in countless military schools and staff academies throughout the world.” Clausewitz’s disciples were no less influential with their ideas of military-civilian relations and professionalism.

⁷⁰ Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, in an address of July 20, 1927, as quoted in El Mercurio, July 21, 1927. Ibáñez, though far from a military thinker of the stature of de Gaulle of Seeckt did assign a new role to the officer, already a priest, knight and teacher. Ibáñez called the officer corps a team of doctors performing surgery. “It is necessary to apply cauterization from top to bottom; after this operation the country will be tranquil, happy at home and respected abroad. ” El Mercurio, February 9, 1927. The medical metaphor has been applied frequently to the 1973 overthrow of President Salvador Allende by members of the post-1973 Junta of Government. It is quite popular among those who believe in an organic society and polity.

⁷¹ See Nunn, , The Military in Chilean History, chap. 10, “The Repudiation of the Military, 1931–32,” esp. 195–217 Google Scholar. On pre-1973 army hostility to Marxism see 121–23, 242–29.

⁷² Interview with General (r.) Oscar Novoa Fuentes, Santiago, Septmeber 12, 1962. See also Barceló Lira, José M., “La evolución del ejército chileno desde la ocupación del territorio araucano (1859–1879) hasta nuestros días,” MECH (March-April 1935), 214–15.Google Scholar

⁷³ Interview with General Novoa, Santiago, October 24, 1962.

⁷⁴ This conclusion is based on interviews and conversations with Chilean officers and civilians connected with the Ministry of National Defense, March-December 1962, September 1969, May 1972, August-September 1975 and August-September 1978.

⁷⁵ See supra, n. 23. Until the overthrow of Allende, official army sources contained no anti-Marxist material; this would have constituted deliberation.

⁷⁶ “E1 ejército y su función social de acuerdo con la necesidad de capacitar el individuo en un oficio que le permita desempeñarse en forma más eficiente al ser restituido a la sociedad civil,” MECH (September-October 1935), 835. Emphasis mine.

⁷⁷ Y así vamos: Ensayo crítico (Santiago, 1938), 39–41.

⁷⁸ Estudios militares (Santiago, 1933), 269–79.

⁷⁹ “La instrucción escolar en el ejército,” MECH (May-June 1935), 397 ff. Emphasis mine.

⁸⁰ “Apuntes y notas sobre la formación del oficial de hoy,” MECH (January-February 1937), 1–28 passim.

⁸¹ MECH (January-February 1938), 121–36; Weygand, , “Como educar a nuestra juventud,” MECH (May-June 1938), 453–76; and (July-August 1938), 585–602. Originally published as a pamphlet, Comment élever nos fis? (Paris, 1937).Google Scholar

⁸² Weygand, 453–61, 592–95.

⁸³ MECH (November-December 1939), 851–67.

⁸⁴ On education see “Reclutador,” “La educación militar del país,” MECH (January 1932), 39–44; the Barceló Lira essay cited supra, n. 72; and the reprint of Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Nájera, Francisco Castillo, “El ejército como instrumento de educación,” MECH (March-April 1940), 271–76Google Scholar. On physical education and training see Ramón, Venegas O., “Ejercicios físicos desde el punto de vista militar,” MECH (January 1931), 33–43 Google Scholar; Daniel, Sánchez A., “¿Convendría introducir alguna reforma en el sistema de educadión física que actualmente emplea el ejército?”, MECH (February 1931), 131–42Google Scholar; Montalva, Ramón Cañas, “Escuela activa: Nuestra reforma educacional y el ejército,” MECH (April 1931), 419–23Google Scholar; Carmona, Jorge, “¡Hacia la economía! La racionalización de nuestra instrucción militar,” MECH (November 1931), 587–93Google Scholar; Weygand, 461–67; Electo, Pereda L., “Cultura física en el ejército: Sus proyecciones sociales,” MECH (September-October 1940), 665–86.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ MECH (September-October 1940), 687–709.

⁸⁶ Aldona, 687–703,passim.

⁸⁷ “La profesión militar,” MECH (March-April 1942), 1135–40,passim.

⁸⁸ MECH (November-December 1942), 2021–28.

⁸⁹ “La instrucción escolar pre-militar,” MECH (January-February 1943), 52. See also Lazcano, Marcial Delgado, “La instrucción primaria en el ejército: Su evolución, metodología y pedagogía que han que tomar en cuenta para su desarrollo,” MECH (March-April 1946), 41–56, which surveys the army's contributions to primary education since the turn of the century.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ “La intervención del ejército en obras de beneficio público,” MECH (September-October 1947), 71. See the supportive response to Videla's vain plea in León, Guillard T., “La intervención del ejército en obras de beneficio público,” MECH (May-June 1949), 90–97.Google Scholar

⁹¹ MECH (July-August 1953), 79–84; and Horacio Arce Fernández’ prologue to Nickelberg, Aminodow Feller and Salcedo, Fernando Lyon, Estatuto jurídico del personal de las fuerzas armadas (Santiago, 1957).Google Scholar

⁹² Reyes, Luis Valenzuela, “Misión de las fuerzas armadas y su participación en el desenvolvimiento normal de nuestra vida nacional,” MECH (May-June 1958), 22–29.Google Scholar

⁹³ Valenzuela, 25–26.

⁹⁴ VaIenzuela, 26–29.

⁹⁵ MECH (May-June 1958), 3–4.

⁹⁶ “La política militar y la opinión pública,” MECH (May-June 1964), 15–19.

⁹⁷ Hiriart, 16–19, passim. See also Rojas, René González Contributión de las fuerzas armadas al desarrollo económico: Hacia una revisión de conceptos conveniente para países sub-desarrollados (Santiago, 1965).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Cited supra, n. 18.

⁹⁹ “Las fuerzas armadas en el tercer mundo,” MECH (July-August 1970), 11–51. This is a sophisticated essay, and with the Valenzuela and Hiriart pieces must be considered basic to a grasp of recent military-civilian relations.

¹⁰⁰ López, 46–50.

¹⁰¹ This is also the case with Polloni, Horacio, Las fuerzas armadas de Chile en la vida national (Santiago, 1972).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Díaz Feliú, Gustavo A., “El soldado alemán: El ejército chileno debe conservar su tradición prusiana,” MECH (May-June 1971), 126–27Google Scholar. This brief essay stops short of praising the goose-step so greatly scorned by “A.M.” nearly three quarters of a century before, but still defended on the eve of World War II. See for example Víctor, Chávez D., “Una opinión sobre el paso regular,” MECH (May-June 1938), 363–72.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ MECH (November-December 1971), 41-68. Indeed, MECH reflected a soul-searching process in its May-June 1972 issue, with several articles on the officer class. See the two French essays “Oficiales ¿Para qué oficio?” by Moreigne, Jean Paul and Beaufre, General; and the latter’s “La vocación militar y la tradición,” 3–15 Google Scholar. See also Hugh Bicheno's review of Joxe’s, Alain Las fuerzas armadas en el sistema politico de Chile (Santiago, 1970), 26–37 Google Scholar; and Major (Chaplain) Carlos, Leyton R., “Vocación y espíritu militar,” 79–81.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ This is discussed in Nunn, , The Military in Chilean History, 266–79Google Scholar. For military opinions on the Schneider assassination and hostility toward Allende, see also Varas, Florencia, Conversaciones con Viaux (Santiago, 1972)Google Scholar. General Roberto Viaux Marambio led the military protest movement of 1969 known as the Tacnazo and was involved in the plot to sequester General Schneider.

¹⁰⁵ Constitución política de la república de Chile (1925): Art. 22, inciso 1° (January 9, 1971). Emphasis mine (and that of army personnel with whom I have conversed).

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in El Mercurio, May 8, 1970. The Doctrine was developed after the discovery of plotting in March that would have forestalled chances of an Allende electoral victory.

¹⁰⁷ Patria y Libertad (probably May-June 1972).

¹⁰⁸ Tacna (April 1972).

¹⁰⁹ Tacna (October-November 1972), 6–7. The retirement of General Canales is neatly summarized in Moss, Robert, Chile’s Marxist Experiment (Newton Abbot, Devon, 1973), 162–3.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ “La doctrina Schneider,” El Mercurio, November 5, 1972.

¹¹¹ político, El poder y armadas, las fuerzas,” Punto Final, Documentos (April 10, 1973),2–11 Google Scholar. See also Rojas, Robinson, “The Chilean Armed Forces: The Role of the Military in the Popular Unity Government,” in Johnson, Dale L., ed., The Chilean Road to Socialism (Garden City, N.Y., 1973), 310–22.Google Scholar

¹¹² No hay más alternativa que las fuerzas armadas,” Tacna (June 1973), 4–6. See also Martínez, Hugo Tágle, “Comunidad nacional y fuerzas armadas,” Portada (July 1973), 7–13 Google Scholar, wherein the state, nation and society are held responsible for the well-being of the armed forces, and armed forces’ intervention to assure military well-being is justified. That the state, nation and society should be held accountable to the armed forces had only been expressed by military writers in Chile until the early 1970’s.

¹¹³ “Las fuerzas armadas y la historia política chilena,” Punto Final, Documentos (July 3, 1973), 1–16.

¹¹⁴ “Los militares y la seguridad nacional,” Punto Final, Documentos (July 31, 1973), 15–16. A valuable source of documentary sources on efforts by Marxists to redefine the army’s role is García, Pío, ed., Las fuerzas armadas y el golpe de estado en Chile (Mexico, D. F., 1974)Google Scholar. This is a compilation of articles from Chile hoy.

¹¹⁵ For information on attempts by the extreme left to subvert discipline in the army, navy and air force, and seize power by force of arms, see Boizard, Ricardo (Picotón), Proceso a la tración: Detalles intimos del sumario de la FACH (Santiago, 1974)Google Scholar; Herrera, Genaro Arriagada, De la vía chilena a la vía insurreccional (Santiago, 1974)Google Scholar; Silva, Lautaro , Allende: El fin de una aventura (Santiago, 1974).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ El arte de mandar: Principios del mando para el uso de los oficiales de todos los grados, Biblioteca del Oficial, vol. 47 (Santiago, 1973), 84. The Biblioteca del Oficial series is published in separate volumes of MECH.

¹¹⁷ Gavet, 87–135, passim, esp. 89–101. This work was originally published as L’Art de commander (Paris 1899).

¹¹⁸ The publication of a second edition of Barros’ book (Santiago, 1973) was no coincidence. It was vol. 48 of the Biblioteca del Oficial series, immediately following El arte de mandar. General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, then Chief of the General Staff was on the consultative commission that approved the second edition. Two leading South American authorities on civil-military relations remarked to me that they considered the revival of Vigilia de armas to be “significant with regard to the question of a military mentality,” and “indicative of a desire to reinforce cohesion in a critical period.” Conversations with General (r.) Guglialmelli, Juan Enrique, editor, Estrategia, Buenos Aires, September 9, 1975 Google Scholar; and Víctor Villanueva, Lima, September 17, 1975. It was General Guglialmelli who first impressed upon me the enduring appeal of Goltz’ treatise in South American army circles, during a conversation in May 1972.

¹¹⁹ (Santiago, 1973). The book, edited under auspices of the Instituto de Estudios Generales, was not published until three weeks after September 1 1, 1973, but most of the essays were written and availalbe earlier in the year.

¹²⁰ Ibáñez, , “Naturaleza y legitimidad de la vocación militar,” 11–33 Google Scholar; Miranda, , “Las fuerzas armadas en el ordenamiento jurídico chileno,” 34–70 Google Scholar; MacHale, , “Las relaciones internacionales bajo el gobierno de la unidad popular,” 122–39Google Scholar; Domic, K., “Destrucción de las fuerzas armadas por el partido comunista,” 237–69Google Scholar; and “Modelo indonesio de golpe de estado comunista,” 270–86. Interviews and conversations with Ibáñez, MacHale and Miranda, August 25, 26, 27., 28, September 1, 21, 5, 1975. All three used the verb “incite” with no hesitation. Miranda was adamant in his argument that the armed forces were obliged to “participate” in political affairs—in fact already did so—by virtue of legally assigned responsibilities: a civilian argument for an internal security role, in short, quite similar to those used by the military in Argentina, Brazil and Peru to justify political activities. The manifesto of September 11, 1973 shows the strong influence of this volume. Yet it is also strongly reminiscent of manifestos issued in 1919, 1924, 1925, 1927 and 1955 by disgruntled officers.

¹²¹ Widow, Juan Antonio, “El derecho de rebelión,” Tizona (July 1973), 9–16 Google Scholar; Widow, , “Los problemas de un gobierno militar,” Tizona (June 1973),4–8 Google Scholar; and Luis, Giachino P., “Antecedentes del alzamiento nacional español,” Tizona (August 1973), 16–22.Google Scholar

¹²² See “Cuando ejército dijo ¡Basta!”, Tacna (August 1973), 4–6; and Miranda, “El nacionalismo está de pie,” Ibid., 3.

¹²³ Interview with General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Santiago, September 3, 1975.

¹²⁴ Interviews and conversations with (navy) Captain Mario Duvauchelle, Undersecretary of Justice, Santiago, August 26, 1975; General Gustavo Alvarez Aguila, Chief of the General Staff, and Generals Carlos Forrestier Haensgen and Odlanier Mena, General Staff, Santiago, August 28, 1975; Admiral Ernesto Jobet, Undersecretary of the Navy, Santiago, August 28, 1975; Colonel Oscar Coddou Vivanco, Undersecretary of War, Santiago, August 29, 1975; (navy) Captain Carlos Ashton, Director, Foreign Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Santiago, August 29, 1975; Admiral Jorge Swett Madge, Rector Delegate, Catholic University of Chile, Santiago, September 2, 1975; Colonel (r.) Eugenio Reyes, Rector Delegate, State Technical University, Santiago, September 3, 1975.

¹²⁵ With this in mind, army journals have undergone editorial changes that call for more material of a non-technical nature in order to orient junior officers and non-commissioned officers toward the military's new mission. Conversations with Colonel (r.) Raúl Toro Arriagada, editor, MECH; and Aylwin, Gonzalo Mendoza, Armas y Servicios, August-September 1975 Google Scholar. The new Armas y Servicios (No. 1, December, 1974) combines in one publication the former journals published by the various branches of the army. Articles in the latter are by non-commissioned personnel as well as officers.

¹²⁶ Interview with General Pinochet, September 3, 1975. Careful inclusion of the Carabineros in such statements and in public declarations is now no token reference. The Carabineros commandant is a member of the Junta of Government and authority over the Carabineros has been transferred from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of National Defense.

¹²⁷ Geopolítica, 2nd edition (Santiago, 1974), 24. Pinochet’s book was originally published as Vol. 34 of the Biblioteca del Oficial (Santiago, 1968). He promises a second volume once he has time to write it: “Like many scholars I find myself busy with other things!” Interview with General Pinochet, September 3, 1975.

¹²⁸ Vigilia de armas, 2nd edition, 10.