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Existence theory for games of pricing and technology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Kokou Y. Abalo
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, Erskine College, Due West, SC 29639, USA.
Michael M. Kostreva
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634–0975, USA.
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Abstract

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A differential game model of a technological service industry is reformulated as an equivalent game over a function space by direct substitution of the solutions of the state equations. For this game, Nash equilibria are shown to exist under certain mild assumptions. A generalization is considered in which each firm has a choice of three different objective functions, which may reflect distinct management options in a technological service industry. Nash equilibria for the generalized version exist under similar mild assumptions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Australian Mathematical Society 2002