Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T14:02:28.370Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Optimal Insurance Coverage under Bonus-Malus Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2014

Jon Holtan*
Affiliation:
if P&C Insurance Ltd., Oslo, Norway
*
if P&C Insurance Ltd., P.O. Box 1340 Vika, N-0114 Oslo, Norway
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

The paper analyses the questions: Should – or should not – an individual buy insurance? And if so, what insurance coverage should he or she prefer? Unlike classical studies of optimal insurance coverage, this paper analyses these questions from a bonus-malus point of view, that is, for insurance contracts with individual bonus-malus (experience rating or no-claim) adjustments. The paper outlines a set of new statements for bonus-malus contracts and compares them with corresponding classical statements for standard insurance contracts. The theoretical framework is an expected utility model, and both optimal coverage for a fixed premium function and Pareto optimal coverage are analyzed. The paper is an extension of another paper by the author, see Holtan (2001), where the necessary insight to – and concepts of – bonus-malus contracts are outlined.

Information

Type
Workshop
Copyright
Copyright © International Actuarial Association 2001