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² For the background of the Turkish War, see also Redlich, Oswald, Das Werden einer Groβmacht: Österreich 1700–1740 (Brünn: R. M. Rohrer, 1942)Google Scholar; Cassels, Lavender, The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire 1717–1740 (London: Murray, 1966)Google Scholar; Beer, Adolf, Die orientalische Politik Österreichs seit 1774 (Prague: F. Tempsky, 1883)Google Scholar; von Arneth, Alfred, Geschichte Maria Theresias, 10 vols. (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1863), IGoogle Scholar; and Wolf, Adam and von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Hans, Österreich unter Maria Theresia, Josef II. und Leopold II., 1740–1792 (Berlin: G. Grote, 1884)Google Scholar; Anderson, Matthew Smith, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Criste, Oskar, Kriege unter Kaiser Josef II. (Vienna: W. Seidel und Sohn, 1904).Google Scholar

³ Well over a hundred plans for the eventual dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire have been identified in various European archives. See Beer, Adolf, “Denkschriften des Fürsten Wenzel Kaunitz-Rietberg,” Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte, Vol. XLVIII (1872), pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

⁴ Arneth, I, 99. The correspondence of the principal Austrian personalities involved may be found in Beer, Adolf, Joseph II., Leopold II., und Kaunitz: Ihr Briefwechsel (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1873)Google Scholar; von Arneth, Alfred, Joseph II. und Katharina von Ruβland: Ihr Briefwechsel (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1869)Google Scholar; von Arneth, Alfred, Joseph II. und Leopold von Toskana: Ihr Briefwechsel von 1781 bis 1790, 2 vols. (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1872)Google Scholar; Brunner, Sebastian, Correspondances intimes de l'empereur Joseph II avec son ami le comte de Cobenzl et son premier ministre le prince de Kaunitz (Mainz: Francis Kirchheim, 1871)Google Scholar; Beer, Adolf and von Fiedler, Joseph, Joseph II. und Graf Ludwig Cobenzl: Ihr Briefwechsel, 2 vols., Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, LIII and LIV (Vienna: C. Gerald's Sohn, 1901)Google Scholar; and Schlitter, Hans, Kaunitz, Philipp Cobenzl und Spielmann: Ihr Briefwechsel 1779–1792 (Vienna: A. Holzhausen, 1899).Google Scholar

⁵ See Bernard, Paul P., Joseph II and Bavaria: Two Eighteenth Century Attempts at German Unification (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Beer, , “Denkschriften des Fürsten Wenzel Kaunitz-Rietberg,” p. 41.Google Scholar

⁷ For the Russian background, see Uebersberger, H., Ruβlands Orient-Politik in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1913)Google Scholar; and Hösch, Edgar, “Das sogenannte ‘griechische’ Projekt Katharinas II.,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, n.s., XII (1964), 168–206.Google Scholar

⁸ Beer, and Fiedler, , Joseph II. und Graf Ludwig Cobenzl: Ihr Briefwechsel, II, 151–153; 163–164; 178–179.Google Scholar

⁹ The best account of the Ottoman background is to be found in Shaw, Stanford J., Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim II, 1789–1807 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), chapter 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ The degree to which the revolt in the Netherlands affected Joseph's freedom of movement may be seen from Davis, Walter W., Joseph II: An Imperial Reformer for the Austrian Netherlands (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1974), p. 243 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹ Brunner, , Correspondances intimes de l'empereur Joseph II, p. 60.Google Scholar

¹² Prussian reactions to previous Austrian thrusts in the direction of the Ottoman Empire are best covered in Lord, Robert H., The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1915)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on Prussian policy, see also Bailleu, P., “Graf Hertzberg,” Historische Zeitschrift, n.s., XLII, no. 6 (1879), p. 442 ff.Google Scholar; and Beer, Adolf, Die Erste Theilung Polens, 3 vols. (Vienna: C. Gerald's Sohn, 1873).Google Scholar Prussian policy in these matters was to be dominated by a chimera: the Foreign Minister, Count Hertzberg, had conceived a scheme whereby Austria would be allowed considerable conquests of Ottoman territory but, so as not to emerge from the war inordinately strengthened, would return Galicia to Poland. The Poles, in return, would give up Danzig and Toruń to Prussia, which would pocket these strategic and prosperous towns merely for having taken the trouble of coming up with the idea. On a previous occasion, when Hertzberg had proposed a similarly visionary scheme to Frederick II, the king had written in the margin “allez vous promener avec vos idées de, …” but Frederick William was not the man to discern things this clearly.

¹³ Brunner, , Correspondances intimes de l'empereur Joseph II, p. 66Google Scholar; Roider, , “Kaunitz, Joseph II and the Turkish War,” pp. 544–545.Google Scholar There is a fascinating story to the effect that a follower of the False Messiah, Sebastian Frank, a man named Moses Dobruška, who at the time was using the name Franz Thomas von Schönfeld and who moved on the outskirts of the Viennese rationalist circle which was sometimes consulted by Joseph, urged that the Emperor make war as a means of furthering Frank's ascendance over the Jews of the Ottoman Empire. However Dobruška's biographer doubts the truth of this account. See Scholem, Gerschom, Du Frankisme au Jacobinisme: La vie de Moses Dobruška (Paris: Gallimard; le Seuil, 1981 ), p. 20.Google Scholar It has, however, been established that the prominent Viennese Jewish banker, Nathan Amstein, negotiated a substantial loan from his father-in-law, the Berlin banker Daniel Itzig, to help Joseph finance the Turkish war. The loan, however, was blocked by the Prussian crown, which had no interest in supporting Joseph's campaign. See Karniel, Josef, “Zur Auswirkung der Toleranzpatente für die Juden in der Habsburger-Monarchie im josephinischen Jahrzehnt,” Barton, Peter F., ed., Im Zeichen der Toleranz. Aufsätze zur Toleranzgesetzgebung des 18. Jahrhunderts in den Reichen Joseph II., ihren Voraussetzungen und ihren Folgen. Eine Festschrift, Studien und Texte zur Kirchengeschichte und Geschichte, Ser. 2, no. 8 (Vienna: Institut für Protestantische Kirchengeschichte, 1981).Google Scholar

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¹⁵ Academia Republicii Populare Romîne, Istoria Romîneiei (Bucharest: Academia Republicii Populare Romîne, 1964), III, 715–716.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Stefanović-Vilovsky, , “Belgrad während des Krieges Österreichs und Rußlands gegen die Pforte, 1787–1792,” p. 140.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 141–142.

¹⁸ Vienna, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilung, Türkei, V, fol. 20 ff.

¹⁹ Stefanović-Vilovsky, p. 143. See also Haumant, Émile, La Formation de la Yougoslavie (Paris: Bossard, 1930), p. 191.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 158–159.

²¹ Djordjević, Dimitrije and Fischer-Galati, Stephen, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 65–66.Google Scholar It is of interest to note that the Croatian population within the borders of the Austrian monarchy in no way identified itself with the war. See Guldescu, Stanko, The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom 1526–1792 (The Hague: Mouton, 1970).Google Scholar

²² As early as 1788 the Prince de Ligne, acting as Joseph's special envoy, had suggested to Catherine that the Principalities might be united and formed into a kingdom under Potemkin. See Bratianu, George Iowan, Origines et formation de l'unité roumaine (Bucharest: Institut d'histoire universelle “N. lorga,” 1943), p. 181.Google Scholar The frequently encountered assertion that the Austrians, in occupying the Principalities, were reviving medieval claims to them on behalf of the Hungarian crown (cf. Gáldi, Ladislaus and Makkai, Ladislaus, Geschichte der Rumänen, Etudes sur l'Europe centre-orientale/Ostmitteleuropäische Bibliothek, XXXVI [Budapest: Ostmitteleuropäische Bibliothek, 1942], 192)Google Scholar seems to be largely without foundation. Rather, the Austrians seemed to look on the Romanians as a propitiatory gift to Russia, in the hope that this would dissuade them from pushing farther north into the Balkans. Ligne, in particular, was concerned about Russian intentions:“… de Grecs en Grecs on s'approche de la Hongrie.”

²³ Regele, Oskar, “Der österreichische Hofkriegsrat 1556–1848,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Supplement, I (1949), 58.Google Scholar

²⁴ de Hurmuzaki, Eudoxiu, Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor, XIX, no. 1 (Bucharest: C. Göbl, 1922), 308.Google Scholar

²⁵ Ibid., p. 321.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 318, 325.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 391–399. See also Lupaş, Ioan, Zur Geschichte der Rumänen. Aufsätze und Vorträge (Sibiu: Druck Krafft und Drotleff, 1943), p. 454.Google Scholar

²⁸ The best description of the campaign is that of Count Langeren who took part in it on the Austrian side. See Hurmuzaki, , Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor, Supplement, I, no. 3, 88 ff.Google Scholar

²⁹ Hurmuzaki, , Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor, XIX, no. 1, 432–454.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid., p.458.

³¹ Reports that all the leading boyars had been executed later proved to be false. See SirKeith, Robert Murray, Memoirs and Correspondence, 2 vols. (London: Henry Colburn, 1849), II, 311.Google Scholar

³² Hurmuzaki, , Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor, XIX, no. 1, 505–510.Google Scholar

³³ Recent Romanian scholarship is agreed that the period of Austro-Russian occupation witnessed the first reemergence of the Romanian national movement since the Middle Ages. See Teodor, Pompiliu, Enlightenment and Romanian Society, (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1980), p. 131.Google Scholar Such a movement could not have been entirely welcome to the Austrians as it found resonance almost at once in Transylvania. See Prodan, D., Supplex Libellus Valachorum; or, The Political Struggle of the Romanians in Transylvania during the 18th Century (Bucharest: Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971), p. 286.Google Scholar The Austrians, moreover, viewed Romanian national agitation with great suspicion also because they were concerned lest it take the form of another Horiá rebellion. See Lupaş, , Zur Geschichte der Rumänen, p. 455.Google Scholar

³⁴ Hurmuzaki, , Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor, supp. I, no. 3, 81.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid., 92 ff.

³⁶ Shaw, , Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim II, 1789–1807, pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

³⁷ For these, see particularly Gragger, Robert, Preuβen, Weimar und die ungarische Königskrone (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1923)Google Scholar; and Király, Belá K., Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Decline of Enlightened Despotism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

³⁸ Schlitter, Hans, “Die Sendung Birkenstocks nach Berlin und der ‘große Plan’ Hertzbergs,” Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte Österreichs, II ( 1907), 25–29Google Scholar; von Vivenot, Alfred, Die Politik des österreichischen Staatskanzlers Fürsten Kaunitz-Rietberg unter Kaiser Leopold II., vol. I of von Vivenot, Alfred, Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik Österreichs, 5 vols. (Vienna: Braumüller, 1873), pp. 1–3.Google Scholar See also Prutz, Hans, Preuβische Geschichte, 4 vols. (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1901), pp. 277–280.Google Scholar

³⁹ Arneth, , Joseph II. und Leopold von Toskana: Ihr Briefwechsel, II, 280–295.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Wandruszka, Adam, Leopold II., 2 vols. (Vienna & Munich: Verlag Herold, 1965), II, 262.Google Scholar One irony in the situation was that Joseph, who, throughout his reign, had repeatedly blundered as the result of having underestimated the ability of Prussia to oppose him, now exaggerated the Prussian threat. In spite of Frederick William's bluster, the Prussian army was so unprepared for war that the minister in charge of its mobilization, Count Schulenburg-Blumberg, committed suicide. See Jany, Curt, Geschichte der Preuβischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1914, 2nd ed., 4 vols. (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1967), III, 224–226.Google Scholar It is not without interest that, a century later, Bismarck was of the opinion that Prussian policy had gone badly awry on this occasion; it would have benefited Prussia far more to encourage Austria to expand into the Balkans. See von Bissing, Wilhelm, Friedrich Wilhelm II. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1967), pp. 79–80.Google Scholar It is true, of course, that Leopold was even more determined than Joseph to make an end of the war. As he saw it, restoring the inner tranquility of Hungary was worth any sacrifice. See Silagi, Denis, Ungarn und der geheime Mitarbeiterkreis Kaiser Leopolds II. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1961), pp. 30–34.Google Scholar

⁴¹ An immediate consequence of Reichenbach, though, was that the Viennese populace, which had already rioted in 1788 because of the substantial increase in the price of bread caused by the war, once again engaged in demonstrations. See Reinalter, Helmut, Aufgeklärter Absolutismus und Revolution. Zur Geschichte des Jakobinertums und der frühdemokratischen Bestrebungen in der Habsburgermonarchie (Vienna, Cologne, Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1980), p. 67Google Scholar; and Benda, Kálmán, “Probleme des Josephinismus und des Jakobinertums,” Südost-Forschungen, XXV (1966), 48.Google Scholar These disorders were also attributable to the circumstance that throughout the war, the governmentally controlled Viennese press had reported nothing but victories, some real, some imagined. The populace, with some justice, did not see, in the light of the information it had been provided, why its sacrifices should have been entirely in vain. See Lunzer, Marianne, “Josephinisches und antijosephinisches Schrifttum,” in Zöllner, Erich, ed., Öffentliche Meinung in der Geschichte Österreichkunde (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1979).Google Scholar

⁴² Valjavec, Fritz, “Österreich und Rußland auf dem Balkan im 19. Jahrhundert,” Ausgewählte Aufsätze (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1963), pp. 105–107.Google Scholar