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Evidence that phenomenal consciousness is the same as access consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Bernard J. Baars
Affiliation:
The Wright Institute, Berkeley, CA 94704. baars@cogsci.berkeley.edu

Abstract

Block seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a “mongrel problem,” rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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