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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

David Premack
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Psycho-Biologie du Developpement, CNRS, Paris, France; premack@kpbd.msh-paris.fr
Ann James Premack
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Psycho-Biologie du Developpement, CNRS, Paris, France; premack@kpbd.msh-paris.fr

Abstract

Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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