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Affect programs, intentionality, and consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2000

Craig DeLancey
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Program of Cognitive Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 cdelance@alumni.indiana.edu www.cs.indiana.edu/hyplan/cdelance
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Abstract

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I express two concerns with the theory of emotion that Rolls provides: (1) rewards and punishers alone fail to explain the basic emotions; (2) Rolls needs to clarify his notion of the intentionality of emotions. I also criticize his theory of consciousness, arguing that it fails to explain qualia, and that ironically it is emotions which make this most evident.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press