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An epistemological account of visual consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2005

Peter D. Sparks*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309
E. E. Krieckhaus*
Affiliation:
Village Information II, New York, NY 10011
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Abstract:

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O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) explanation of our stream of experience as activities depends on their denial of that palpable, most real aspect of experience: what they call “qualitative experience.” Given the ontological primacy of the qualitative givenness of our experience and the complete absence of actions as experiences in our stream of consciousness, though, all such reductionistic attempts must fail.

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Type
Continuing Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004