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And if the developmental data doesn't quite fit ...

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1998

Barlow Wright
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UD, England barlow.wright@psy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

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Halford et al. seek to provide a framework that unifies distinct developmental phenomena. However, in pursuit of this goal, they sidestep crucial aspects of some well-known developmental benchmarks (most notably Transitive Inference and Object Concept), and they do not acknowledge “repeated” or “direct” experience as possibly being more fundamental than relational complexity, instead, ascribe all experience a secondary role.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press