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Base rates do not constrain nonprobability judgments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Paul D. Windschitl
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011. s1.pdw@isumvs.iastate.edu
Gary L. Wells
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011. s1.pdw@isumvs.iastate.edu

Abstract

Base rates have no necessary relation to judgments that are not themselves probabilities. There is no logical imperative, for instance, that behavioral base rates must affect causal attributions or that base rate information should affect judgments of legal liability. Decision theorists should be cautious in arguing that base rates place normative constraints on judgments of anything other than posterior probabilities.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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