Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T09:41:00.196Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Beliefs, intentions, and evolution: Old versus new psychological game theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Jeffrey P. Carpenter and
Peter Hans Matthews
Jeffrey P. Carpenter*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753 http://community.middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/ http://community.middlebury.edu/~pmatthew/
Peter Hans Matthews*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753 http://community.middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/ http://community.middlebury.edu/~pmatthew/
*
jpc@middlebury.edu
peter.h.matthews@middlebury.edu
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

We compare Colman's proposed “psychological game theory” with the existing literature on psychological games (Geanakoplos et al. 1989), in which beliefs and intentions assume a prominent role. We also discuss experimental evidence on intentions, with a particular emphasis on reciprocal behavior, as well as recent efforts to show that such behavior is consistent with social evolution.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003, pp. 158 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003