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betrayal aversion is reasonable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

jonathan j. koehler
Affiliation:
behavioral decision making faculty, mccombs school of business, the university of texas at austin, austin, tx 78712-0212 koehler@mail.utexas.edu http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/jonathan.koehler/
andrew d. gershoff
Affiliation:
department of marketing, michigan business school, university of michigan, ann arbor, mi 48109-1234 agershof@umich.edu
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Abstract

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we accept sunstein's claim that people often use moral heuristics to make judgments and decisions. however, in situations that include a risk of betrayal, we disagree with sunstein about when the relevant moral heuristic may be said to “misfire.” we suggest that the moral heuristic people apply to avoid the possibility of safety-product betrayal may be reasonable.

Information

Type
open peer commentary
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press