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Biological determinism versus the concept of a person

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Robert Miller
Affiliation:
Department of Anatomy and Structural Biology, School of Medical Science, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand robert.miller@stonebow.otago.ac.nz
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Abstract

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Rose presents an important critique of the determinism and reductionism of modern biology. However, such trends are probably temporary aberrations in the development of science. Another form of determinism which has deeper roots is emerging from modern studies of brain dynamics. To reconcile this evidence with the concept of a “person” will require more radical rethinking of our received notion of natural law.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press