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Can repression become a conscious process?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 December 2006

Simon Boag
Simon Boag*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, 2109, Australia http://www.psy.mq.edu.au/staff/sboag/
*
simon.boag@psy.mq.edu.au
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Abstract:

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A major weakness in Erdelyi's account concerns the claim that repression can become conscious. A relational account of cognition demonstrates that if repression is successful, then the repressive act cannot become known. Additionally, “resistance” further distinguishes “repression” from “suppression.” Rather than blurring the distinction between these processes, it is possible to recognise a series of defences. Suggestions are provided for alternative research avenues.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 29 , Issue 5 , October 2006 , pp. 513 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

References

Notes

1. This viewpoint has a long history, spanning back to Aristotle (see Petocz 1999), through medieval scholasticism (see Pasnau 1997), and emerging in both the American new realists (e.g., E. B. Holt) and British realists (e.g., G. E. Moore, J. Laird, and Samuel Alexander; see Michell 1988). The position is also prominent in the Australian school of Andersonian Realism (see Anderson 1927/1962; 1930/1962; Baker 1986).

2. However, there is no clear difference in quality between unconscious and conscious processes, on the one hand, and normal and pathological behaviour, on the other (see Petocz 1999, p. 232).