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Can teleological behaviorism account for the effects of instructions on self-control without invoking cognition?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Kristi Lemm
Affiliation:
Columbia University, Department of Psychology, New York, NY 10027. kristi@luna.psych.columbia.edu
Yuichi Shoda
Affiliation:
Columbia University, Department of Psychology, New York, NY 10027. kristi@luna.psych.columbia.edu
Walter Mischel
Affiliation:
Columbia University, Department of Psychology, New York, NY 10027. kristi@luna.psych.columbia.edu

Abstract

In its commitment to eschewing internal causes, the teleological behavioristic analysis endeavors to explain self-control through the temporal patterning of behavior, but it leaves unanswered the most challenging questions. It fails to account convincingly for experimental findings in which self-control behavior was predictably changed by verbal instructions to think about and imagine the rewards in different ways.

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