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The Chinese room is a trick

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2004

Peter Kugel
Peter Kugel*
Affiliation:
Computer Science Department, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808 http://www.cs.bc.edu/~kugel/
*
Kugel@bc.edu
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Abstract:

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To convince us that computers cannot have mental states, Searle (1980) imagines a “Chinese room” that simulates a computer that “speaks” Chinese and asks us to find the understanding in the room. It's a trick. There is no understanding in the room, not because computers can't have it, but because the room's computer-simulation is defective. Fix it and understanding appears. Abracadabra!

Information

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , February 2004 , pp. 153 - 154
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

References

Brentano, F. (1874/1973) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, ed. Kraus, O. Duncker and Humbolt. (1973 English edition: Psychology from an empirical standpoint, trans. Rancurello, A. C., Terrell, D. B. & McAlister, L. L.; ed. McAlister, L. L. Routledge and Kegan Paul/Humanities Press. [PK]Google Scholar
Kugel, P. (2002) Computing machines can't be intelligent ( … and Turing said so). Minds and Machines 12(4):563–79. [PK]10.1023/A:1021150928258CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Searle, J. R. (1980) Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3):417–57. [PK]10.1017/S0140525X00005756CrossRefGoogle Scholar