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The cognitive and behavioral sciences: Real patterns, real unity, real causes, but no supervenience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

Don Ross  and
David Spurrett
Don Ross*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260; School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/economics/staff/personalpages/dross/
David Spurrett*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041, South Africa http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/spurrett/
*
dross@commerce.uct.ac.za
spurrett@ukzn.ac.za
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Abstract:

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Our response amplifies our case for scientific realism and the unity of science and clarifies our commitments to scientific unity, nonreductionism, behaviorism, and our rejection of talk of “emergence.” We acknowledge support from commentators for our view of physics and, responding to pressure and suggestions from commentators, deny the generality supervenience and explain what this involves. We close by reflecting on the relationship between philosophy and science.

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Type
Authors' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 5 , October 2004 , pp. 637 - 647
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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