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cognitivism, controversy, and moral heuristics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

matthew d. adler
Affiliation:
university of pennsylvania law school, philadelphia, pa 19104 madler@law.upenn.edu
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Abstract

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sunstein aims to provide a nonsectarian account of moral heuristics, yet the account rests on a controversial meta-ethical view. further, moral theorists who reject act consequentialism may deny that sunstein's examples involve moral mistakes. but so what? within a theory that counts consequences as a morally weighty feature of actions, the moral judgments that sunstein points to are indeed mistaken, and the fact that governmental action at odds with these judgments will be controversial doesn't bar such action.

Information

Type
open peer commentary
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press