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Concepts are not beliefs, but having concepts is having beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Fei Xu
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 fei@psyche.mit.edu jbt@psyche.mit.edu cristina@psyche.mit.edu
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 fei@psyche.mit.edu jbt@psyche.mit.edu cristina@psyche.mit.edu
Cristina M. Sorrentino
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 fei@psyche.mit.edu jbt@psyche.mit.edu cristina@psyche.mit.edu
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Abstract

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We applaud Millikan's psychologically plausible version of the causal theory of reference. Her proposal offers a significant clarification of the much-debated relation between concepts and beliefs, and suggests positive directions for future empirical studies of conceptual development. However, Millikan's revision of the causal theory may leave us with no generally satisfying account of concept individuation in the mind.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press