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Conscious and nonconscious control of action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Antti Revonsuo
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy/Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FIN-20500 Turku, Finland. revonsuo@sara.utu.fi

Abstract

I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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