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Consciousness and its (dis)contents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Jeffrey A. Gray
Affiliation:
Deapartment of psychology, Institution of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park, Denmark Hill, London SES BAF, England. spjtjag@ucl.uk

Abstract

The first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the contents of consciousness, to widen the description of the neural machinery instantiating the comparator system, and to clarify the relationship between the contents of consciousness in the here-and-now and episodic memory.

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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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