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Consciousness, connectionism, and intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

Donelson E. Dulany
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820 ddulany@s.psych.uiuc.edu
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Abstract

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Connectionism can provide useful theories in which consciousness is the exclusive vehicle of explicit representation. The theories may not, however, handle some phenomena adequately: sense of agency, modes and contents of awareness, propositional and deliberative thought, metacognitive awareness and consciousness of self. They should, however, be useful in describing automatic, activational relations among nonpropositional conscious contents.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press