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Consciousness versus states of being conscious

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Ernst Pöppel
Affiliation:
Forschungszentrum, 52425 Julich, Germany e.poeppel@kfa-juelich.de
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Abstract

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States of being conscious (S) can be defined on the basis of temporal information processing. A high-frequency mechanism provides atemporal system states with periods of approximately 30 msec to implement the functional connection of distributed activities allowing the construction of primordial events; a low frequency mechanism characterized by automatic temporal integration sets up temporal windows with approximately 3 seconds duration. This integration mechanism can be used to define S. P-consciousness and A-consciousness as conceived of by Block can be mapped onto these neuronal mechanisms.

Information

Type
Continuing Commentary
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press