As Wilson et al. argue in the target article, evolution must be at the center of a science of change. We agree with the need to incorporate social and cultural learning into a general evolutionary framework. However, in our view, it is a daunting task, if not impossible, to integrate domain-specific “massive modularity” theories of evolutionary psychology with “blank slate” theories of learning and conditioning. In this commentary, we focus on the proposal of Wilson et al. concerning phenotypic plasticity that enables organisms to respond adaptively to their environments, including successfully making intentional cultural changes at scales ranging from individuals to small groups to large populations. We discuss intentional and cultural changes within an evolutionary framework of decision making.

One way of connecting extant literature of judgment and decision making with the theme of intentional change is to consider change as part of risk and uncertainty. Risks are often measured in terms of expected changes as gains or losses. Uncertainty is inherent in changes perceived in opportunities or threats, in benefits or harms. Throughout human evolution and individual life history, we live with uncertainties and deal with risks. Some of the risks are evolutionarily recurrent, whereas others are evolutionarily novel. Recurrent risks forge evolved innate mechanisms to deal with them, whereas novel risks result in actions that are less prepared and more variable and malleable. To understand why some intentional changes succeed and others fail, identifying risks as evolutionarily recurrent or novel is necessary. In addition, the understanding of social and cultural factors that activate or inhibit risk management mechanisms in modern times is important.

As an example of how the risk preference of people adapts to unique features of social group living and cultural systems, Wang (Reference Wang1996a; Reference Wang1996b; Reference Wang2002; Reference Wang2008) demonstrated that the framing effect, an irrational risk preference reversal due to different ways of framing or phrasing the same choice outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman Reference Tversky and Kahneman1981), occurs in large anonymous group contexts. However, the framing effect disappears in evolutionarily typical small group contexts and adapts to cultural specifics. Data from the United States show that group size, which separates the framing effects from no framing effects, is very close to Dunbar's number of 150, which serves as an upper curtailing for social interactions (Dunbar Reference Dunbar1988; Reference Dunbar1993). However, a Chinese sample of group size–dependent framing effects shows a higher group size at the switching point (Wang Reference Wang1996a). This finding indicates a larger conceptual scope of “we-group” has adapted to a culture of higher population density, lower mobility, and more extended social connections. Moreover, new studies found that work experience in large corporations significantly reduces framing effects (e.g., Shimizu & Udagawa Reference Shimizu and Udagawa2011b). These studies suggest experience-induced changes in group size–sensitive risk preference, which adapts to the environment and culture of an organization.

Another example of cultural adaptation was revealed in a cooperative behavior field study. Rao et al. (Reference Rao, Han, Ren, Bai, Zheng, Liu, Wang, Li, Zhang and Li2011) found that behavioral changes on an even larger scale of communities can happen automatically due to “selection by consequence,” or social transmission, as expected by Wilson et al. in the target article. The degree of prosocial behavior after the devastating 2008 Wenchuan earthquake increased proportionally with the level of residential devastation. When threatened by natural hazards, mutual aid can serve as an adaptive mechanism to increase the survival chances of individuals.

Wilson et al. argue, “Left unmanaged, evolutionary processes often take us where we would prefer not to go.” An example in decision making relevant to the above observation is the study of delay of gratification and self-control. People discount the future when they prefer a smaller and sooner (SS) reward to a larger and later (LL) reward. When viewing intentional change as a choice between SS and LL rewards, a set of interesting evolutionary questions can be derived. Some possible questions are: To what extent should natural selection favor a choice preference that is future oriented and green? To what extent can symbolically, culturally, or religiously made changes (e.g., future-oriented green choices) overcome, counterbalance, or change unmanaged evolutionary desires of environmental exploitation?

One nongenetic system that may promote future-oriented choices is the symbotype. According to Wilson et al., a symbotype is a network of symbolic relations that regulates behavior in a way similar to a genotype that produces a phenotype. To achieve such a goal, we argue that education via symbotype is necessary but not sufficient. It takes evolved conservation desires to combat effectively evolved exploitation desires (see also Penn Reference Penn2003; Wilson Reference Wilson1984; Reference Wilson, Kellert and Wilson1993; Reference Wilson2002). Cultural adaptations are foremost biological adaptations. Rational planning is often victimized by seeking pleasure. The success of intentional changes therefore depends on establishing an effective link between intentional behavior and a consistent and stronger reinforcement or prevention mechanism (e.g., conditioning or emotions). Such mechanisms should be hardwired, evolutionarily stable, and intrinsic.

Ecologically destructive humans are also ecologically protective (Penn Reference Penn2003). In his book Biophilia, E. O. Wilson (Reference Wilson1984) proposes that humans have instinctive aesthetic preferences for natural environments and other species. Available evidence indicates that education is not sufficient for evoking conservation behavior (e.g., Hirst et al. Reference Hirst, Berry and Soderstrom1981; Miller et al. Reference Miller, Brickman and Bolen1975). An evolutionary perspective suggests that environmental education will be most effective for triggering changes when it shows how the destruction of the environment harms individual interests (Heinen Reference Heinen1995; Reference Heinen1996; Ridley & Low Reference Ridley and Low1993; Wilson Reference Wilson1984). Moreover, joint forces of symbolic and religious systems should be more efficient than either one alone. Cumulating evidence shows that education plus cultural, traditional, and religious beliefs are an effective means to promote environmental protection and conservation of local biodiversity, as practiced by the Chinese ethnic minorities (e.g., Luo et al. Reference Luo, Liu and Zhang2009; Hongmao et al. Reference Hongmao, Zaifu, Youkai and Jinxiu2002; Xu & Wilkes Reference Xu and Wilkes2004). The suggestion that our evolved “human nature” is a source of environmental exploitation and degradation is not a claim that nothing can be done, but a warning that effective conservation will have to incorporate an understanding of relevant evolved psychological processes to modify human actions (Wilson et al. Reference Wilson, Daly, Gordon and Caro1998, p. 517).