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Constraining the use of constraints

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1999

James L. Dannemiller
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706 jldannem@facstaff.wisc.edu psych.wisc.edu/faculty/bio/dannemil/er.html
William Epstein
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903 we7v@faraday.clas.virginia.edu
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Abstract

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Pylyshyn uses constraints to solve many of the problems associated with the inverse problem in vision. We are sympathetic to such an approach, and indeed, we think that in many cases constraints allow tract-able solutions to otherwise insoluble problems. We argue, however, that Pylyshyn has been too quick to assume that certain perceptual phenomena can be explained by appealing to constraints embodied in the visual machinery. For several more complex perceptual phenomena it is not clear how one proceeds to look for constraints once simple constraints like rigidity have been abandoned.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press