Stanford's proposal is extraordinarily compelling and cleverly weaves together existing empirical and theoretical findings to construct a plausible story regarding the emergence of the distinctive kind of cooperation in which humans routinely engage. Stanford's evolutionary account centers on protecting prosociality and cooperation from exploitation. Stanford's proposed solution – moral externalization – is an attractive option as it both (1) ensures the focal individual is (reasonably) shielded from exploitation and (2) allows similarly minded individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation in novel environments. Both (1) and (2) enhance fitness and, as a result, ensure that those who externalize moral beliefs often outperform their peers.
I focus on just one facet of Stanford's overall picture and attempt to better delineate the kinds of beliefs and norms which would, on Stanford's proposed story, become moralized. I claim that the set of moralized norms and beliefs is more expansive than Stanford appears to suggest and contend that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems – where the threat of exploitation is minimal or non-existent – are likely to be externalized.
To begin, note that although Stanford acknowledges that “nearly any norm or behavior [can] become moralized” (sect. 5, para. 13), it is clear Stanford nonetheless thinks only certain norms are likely to be externalized (namely, those norms protecting prosociality from exploitation). Norms of this kind are particularly crucial because they “maintain the most important evolutionary benefits of moralization itself” (sect. 5, para. 13). Moral externalization is adaptive in large part because it involves and sustains norms regarding “harm, fairness, justice, and the rights of victims” (sect. 5, para. 13). In contrast, rules of etiquette or “mere convention” are unlikely to be externalized as they pertain to cases where the benefits of externalization are minimal. In these circumstances, one does not typically stand to gain or lose much from the behavior of others, and the threat of exploitation is non-existent.
Many strategic scenarios do not involve the threat of exploitation but, unlike the case of etiquette, have real fitness consequences for those involved. Take, for instance, conflictual coordination problems. In these strategic scenarios, individuals must coordinate their behavior to achieve some desired end (perhaps they endeavor to jointly manage a home, or divvy up resources, or establish a property convention). A variety of outcomes allow for successful coordination, but tensions arise as there is disagreement as to which coordinative arrangement is most desirable. These strategic scenarios do not correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma but are instead best conceived of as either a hawk-dove game or the “battle of the sexes.” On this representation, it is clear that free-riding and exploitation are no longer of central concern. Instead, what matters is avoiding miscoordination and ensuring that disagreement does not escalate into violence or jeopardize cooperative endeavors in other domains.
Not surprisingly, norms can easily guide behavior and thus minimize the probability of conflict and miscoordination. John Maynard-Smith, for instance, famously suggested that individuals condition their behavior on some features of the strategic scenario of interest (Maynard Smith Reference Maynard Smith1982). In the case of resource competition, for example, individuals employing the “bourgeois strategy” (i.e., behave aggressively if in possession of the contested resource, acquiesce if not) navigate these scenarios without incident. Individuals could similarly condition their strategic behavior on some features of themselves (such as gender in the case of joint-home management). However the details are spelled out, the results are the same: If all adhere to the same norm, coordination can easily be attained. As a result, individuals have incentive to selectively interact with those adhering to the same norm as themselves.
Furthermore, these norms can guide behaviors in similar, but novel, conflictual coordination problems. Norms of division can be used to allocate meat from the weekly hunt, as well as divide the fruits of novel cooperative endeavors. A gendered division of labor in the home could help individuals assign responsibilities and tasks in other environments. Not only do these norms allow individuals to avoid miscoordination, but they also allow for relatively seamless collaboration in unfamiliar scenarios.
Taken together, these norms secure many benefits and perhaps even rival the benefits associated with the cooperative norms considered by Stanford. Exploitation has severe fitness consequences; the miscoordination in conflictual coordination problems has real and significant costs. Miscoordination can result in the breakdown of collaboration, as well as wasteful and sometimes violent conflict. Demanding that others adhere to similar norms ensures cost-free coordination in familiar and new environments alike. Thus, there appears to be significant pressure for these norms to become moralized.
Is there any evidence to support the claim that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems will become moralized? The experimental literature may not currently be able to provide an answer, as most cases considered in the experiments cited by Stanford involve exploitation or harm. Yet, continuing with the examples given above, conventions of property as well as gendered division-of-labor norms are likely to appear to many as more “objective” and universal than table etiquette or subjective preference for vanilla over chocolate ice cream. At the same time, however, it is far from clear that these norms will be taken to be as objective and binding as norms that prohibit murder or various other harms and injustices. The norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems matter. However, it may be sensible to position such norms somewhere between conventions of etiquette and the fully moralized norms which shield cooperation from exploitation.
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Stanford's proposal is extraordinarily compelling and cleverly weaves together existing empirical and theoretical findings to construct a plausible story regarding the emergence of the distinctive kind of cooperation in which humans routinely engage. Stanford's evolutionary account centers on protecting prosociality and cooperation from exploitation. Stanford's proposed solution – moral externalization – is an attractive option as it both (1) ensures the focal individual is (reasonably) shielded from exploitation and (2) allows similarly minded individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation in novel environments. Both (1) and (2) enhance fitness and, as a result, ensure that those who externalize moral beliefs often outperform their peers.
I focus on just one facet of Stanford's overall picture and attempt to better delineate the kinds of beliefs and norms which would, on Stanford's proposed story, become moralized. I claim that the set of moralized norms and beliefs is more expansive than Stanford appears to suggest and contend that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems – where the threat of exploitation is minimal or non-existent – are likely to be externalized.
To begin, note that although Stanford acknowledges that “nearly any norm or behavior [can] become moralized” (sect. 5, para. 13), it is clear Stanford nonetheless thinks only certain norms are likely to be externalized (namely, those norms protecting prosociality from exploitation). Norms of this kind are particularly crucial because they “maintain the most important evolutionary benefits of moralization itself” (sect. 5, para. 13). Moral externalization is adaptive in large part because it involves and sustains norms regarding “harm, fairness, justice, and the rights of victims” (sect. 5, para. 13). In contrast, rules of etiquette or “mere convention” are unlikely to be externalized as they pertain to cases where the benefits of externalization are minimal. In these circumstances, one does not typically stand to gain or lose much from the behavior of others, and the threat of exploitation is non-existent.
Many strategic scenarios do not involve the threat of exploitation but, unlike the case of etiquette, have real fitness consequences for those involved. Take, for instance, conflictual coordination problems. In these strategic scenarios, individuals must coordinate their behavior to achieve some desired end (perhaps they endeavor to jointly manage a home, or divvy up resources, or establish a property convention). A variety of outcomes allow for successful coordination, but tensions arise as there is disagreement as to which coordinative arrangement is most desirable. These strategic scenarios do not correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma but are instead best conceived of as either a hawk-dove game or the “battle of the sexes.” On this representation, it is clear that free-riding and exploitation are no longer of central concern. Instead, what matters is avoiding miscoordination and ensuring that disagreement does not escalate into violence or jeopardize cooperative endeavors in other domains.
Not surprisingly, norms can easily guide behavior and thus minimize the probability of conflict and miscoordination. John Maynard-Smith, for instance, famously suggested that individuals condition their behavior on some features of the strategic scenario of interest (Maynard Smith Reference Maynard Smith1982). In the case of resource competition, for example, individuals employing the “bourgeois strategy” (i.e., behave aggressively if in possession of the contested resource, acquiesce if not) navigate these scenarios without incident. Individuals could similarly condition their strategic behavior on some features of themselves (such as gender in the case of joint-home management). However the details are spelled out, the results are the same: If all adhere to the same norm, coordination can easily be attained. As a result, individuals have incentive to selectively interact with those adhering to the same norm as themselves.
Furthermore, these norms can guide behaviors in similar, but novel, conflictual coordination problems. Norms of division can be used to allocate meat from the weekly hunt, as well as divide the fruits of novel cooperative endeavors. A gendered division of labor in the home could help individuals assign responsibilities and tasks in other environments. Not only do these norms allow individuals to avoid miscoordination, but they also allow for relatively seamless collaboration in unfamiliar scenarios.
Taken together, these norms secure many benefits and perhaps even rival the benefits associated with the cooperative norms considered by Stanford. Exploitation has severe fitness consequences; the miscoordination in conflictual coordination problems has real and significant costs. Miscoordination can result in the breakdown of collaboration, as well as wasteful and sometimes violent conflict. Demanding that others adhere to similar norms ensures cost-free coordination in familiar and new environments alike. Thus, there appears to be significant pressure for these norms to become moralized.
Is there any evidence to support the claim that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems will become moralized? The experimental literature may not currently be able to provide an answer, as most cases considered in the experiments cited by Stanford involve exploitation or harm. Yet, continuing with the examples given above, conventions of property as well as gendered division-of-labor norms are likely to appear to many as more “objective” and universal than table etiquette or subjective preference for vanilla over chocolate ice cream. At the same time, however, it is far from clear that these norms will be taken to be as objective and binding as norms that prohibit murder or various other harms and injustices. The norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems matter. However, it may be sensible to position such norms somewhere between conventions of etiquette and the fully moralized norms which shield cooperation from exploitation.