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Could phenomenal consciousness function as a cognitive unconscious?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2003

Max Velmans
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University of London, London, SE14 6NW, United Kingdom m.velmans@gold.ac.uk http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/departments/psychology/velmans.htm
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Abstract

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Evidence for unconscious semantic representation suggests that a cognitive unconscious exists. Phenomenal consciousness cannot easily be shown to deal with complex cognitive operations such as those involved in language translation and creativity. A self-organising phenomenal consciousness that controls brain functions also runs into mind/body problems (well recognised in the consciousness studies literature) that Perruchet & Vinter must address.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press