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Cross-cultural differences in norm enforcement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2005

Simon Gächter*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/staff/details/simon_gaechter.htm http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/staff/details/b.herrmann.htm
Benedikt Herrmann*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/staff/details/simon_gaechter.htm http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/staff/details/b.herrmann.htm
Christian Thöni*
Affiliation:
Research Institute for Empirical Economics and Economic Policy, University of St. Gallen, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland http://www.few.unisg.ch
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Abstract

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We argue that the lack of large cross-cultural differences in many games with student subjects from developed countries may be due to the nature of the games studied. These games tap primarily basic psychological reactions, like fairness and reciprocity. Once we look at norm-enforcement, in particular punishment, we find large differences even among culturally rather homogeneous student groups from developed countries.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005