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Emotion, representation, and consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2000

Leonard D. Katz
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology E39-245, Cambridge, MA 02139 lkatz@mit.edu
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Abstract

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Rolls's preliminary definitions of emotion and speculative restriction of consciousness, including emotional sentience, to humans, display behaviorist prejudice. Reinforcement and causation are not by themselves sufficient conceptual resources to define either emotion or the directedness of thought and motivated action. For any adequate definition of emotion or delimitation of consciousness, new physiology, such as Rolls is contributing to, and also the resources of other fields, will be required.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press