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Evolution, the emotions, and rationality in social interaction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

David J. Butler
David J. Butler*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721 and Department of Economics, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia
*
dbutler@eller.arizona.edu
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Abstract:

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Although Colman's criticisms of orthodox game theory are convincing, his assessment of progress toward construction of an alternative is unnecessarily restrictive and pessimistic. He omits an important multidisciplinary literature grounded in human evolutionary biology, in particular the existence and function of social emotions experienced when facing some strategic choices. I end with an alternative suggestion for modifying orthodox game theory.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 156 - 157
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003