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Experience, attention, and mental representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2002

Justin Broackes
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912 Justin_Broackes@brown.edu
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Abstract

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O'Regan & Noë make plausible that perception involves mastery of sensory-motor dependencies. Their rejection of qualia, however, is less persuasive; as is their view that we see only what we are attending to. At times they seem to oppose “internal representation” in general; I argue that they should in fact only be rejecting crude conceptions of brain picturing.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press