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Explanatory force, antidescriptionism, and the common structure of substance concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Jürgen Schröder
Affiliation:
Grünewaldstr. 12, 69126 Heidelberg, Germany jschroel@urz-mail.urz.uni-heidelberg.de
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Abstract

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Millikan's proposal of a common structure of substance concepts does not explain certain conspicuous findings in the psychological literature such as typicality effects, the context sensitivity of these effects, and slips of the tongue. Moreover, it is unclear how antidescriptionism could be relevant to psychological theorizing. Finally, it does not seem to be true that concepts of individuals, stuff, and real kinds have a common structure in older children and in adults.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press