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Extensional assumptions in theories of meaning and concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Gregory L. Murphy
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Beckman Institute, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 glmurphy@uiuc.edu
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Abstract

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The problems that Millikan addresses in theories of concepts arise from an extensional view of concepts and word meaning. If instead one assumes that concepts are psychological entities intended to explain human behavior and thought, many of these problems dissolve.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press