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Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Tiziana Zalla
Affiliation:
Centre de Recherche en Épistémologie Appliqué (CREA), Ecole Polytechnique, 75005 Paris, France. palma@poly.polytechnique.fr and zalla@polytechnique.fr
Adriano P. Palma
Affiliation:
Centre de Recherche en Épistémologie Appliqué (CREA), Ecole Polytechnique, 75005 Paris, France. palma@poly.polytechnique.fr and zalla@polytechnique.fr

Abstract

In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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