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Is empirical imagination a constraint on adaptationist theory construction?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2003

Thomas E. Dickins and
David W. Dickins
Thomas E. Dickins
Affiliation:
Brain and Cognition Research Group, Division of Psychology, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham NG1 4BU, United Kingdom thomas.dickins@ntu.ac.uk http://ess.ntu.ac.uk/Dickins
David W. Dickins
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZU, United Kingdom dickins@liverpool.ac.uk http://www.liv.ac.uk/Psychology/DeptInfo/StaffProfile/DDickins.html
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Abstract

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Andrews et al. present a form of instrumental adaptationism that is designed to test the hypothesis that a given trait is an adaptation. This epistemological commitment aims to make clear statements about behavioural natural kinds. The instrumental logic is sound, but it is the limits of our empirical imagination that can cause problems for theory construction.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , August 2002, pp. 515 - 516
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press