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Is real self-deception really all that biased?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

James Friedrich
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Willamette University, Salem, OR 97301 jfriedri@willamette.edu
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Abstract

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The mechanisms invoked to demonstrate how self-deception can occur without intention or awareness imply that self-deceptive beliefs are nevertheless the outcome of inappropriate and often egoistically driven processes. In contrast, models of pragmatic reasoning suggest that self-deception may well be the “reasonable” output of a more generalized, adaptive approach to hypothesis testing.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press