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Is the dynamical hypothesis falsifiable? On unification in theories of cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

David C. Noelle
Affiliation:
Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 noelle@cnbc.cmu.edu www.cnbc.cmu.edu/~noelle/
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Abstract

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The dynamical hypothesis is strong in that, for it to be true, every cognitive phenomenon must be best modeled by a dynamical system. Depending on how it is interpreted, however, the hypothesis may be seen as probably false or even unfalsifiable. Strengthening the hypothesis to require unification, or at least coherence, across models in different cognitive domains alleviates this problem.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press