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Mapping Millikan's conceptual work onto (empirical) work by psychologists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Lloyd K. Komatsu
Lloyd K. Komatsu
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057 Ikomatsu@carleton.edu
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Abstract

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There are three points of difference between psychologists' assumptions and those that Millikan suggests:(1) concepts as representations versus concepts as reflectinga capacity; (2) concepts having a role in categorization and inference versus a role in reidentification; and (3) the “basic level” as an aspect of the “vertical” dimension of categories versus being a kind of category, on a par with natural kinds.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 76 - 77
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press