Hostname: page-component-6898cfcb55-kwdml Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-11T10:45:58.615Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Mental imagery doesn't work like that

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 March 2003

Stephen M. Kosslyn,
William L. Thompson and
Giorgio Ganis
Stephen M. Kosslyn
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 smk@wjh.harvard.edu www.wjh.harvard.edu/~kwn/
William L. Thompson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 smk@wjh.harvard.edu www.wjh.harvard.edu/~kwn/
Giorgio Ganis
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 smk@wjh.harvard.edu www.wjh.harvard.edu/~kwn/
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

This commentary focuses on four major points: (1) “Tacit knowledge” is not a complete explanation for imagery phenomena, if it is an explanation at all. (2) Similarities and dissimilarities between imagery and perception are entirely consistent with the depictive view. (3) Knowledge about the brain is crucial for settling the debate. (4) It is not clear what sort of theory Pylyshyn advocates.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , April 2002, pp. 198 - 200
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press