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Modelling imitation with sequential games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Andrew M. Colman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, England amc@leicester.ac.uk www.le.ac.uk/psychology/amc/amc.html
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Abstract

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A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own, provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press